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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2017 summer transfer window, the football world was
turned on its head when French powerhouse, Paris Saint-Germain
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(“PSG”), undertook a record-breaking spending spree. 1 PSG purchased
Neymar da Silva Santos Junior from Barcelona FC for approximately
EU€221 million, breaking the previous record set by Manchester
United’s EU€96 million purchase of Paul Pogba from Juventus during
the 2016 summer transfer window. 2 PSG followed this record-breaking
purchase with a deal to purchase teenage French sensation, Kylian
Mbappe, from AS Monaco FC for a future fee of approximately
EU€178 million, made payable in 2018. 3 These transfers have brought
into question European football’s governing body, the Union of
European Football Associations (“UEFA”), and its regulations
intended to prevent exorbitant transfers and teams spending beyond
their means. In 2010, UEFA promulgated rules intended to curtail
clubs’ reckless spending and imprudent corporate governance. These
rules are called the Financial Fair Play Regulations (“FFP”).
Since their promulgation, UEFA has sparingly issued severe
punishments for clubs’ failures to comply with FFP. PSG’s 2017
summer spending spree is likely an egregious violation of FFP.
Consequently, UEFA’s resolve will be put to the test when determining
what, if any, repercussions will follow. To complicate this issue, legal
uncertainties surrounding FFP create a dilemma for UEFA and has
placed the governing body in a precarious situation. UEFA can either
impose severe sanctions and face the legal challenges PSG would likely
file in response or impose tempered sanctions and leave FFP toothless.
This Note provides background on UEFA’s Financial Fair Play
Regulations and its purposes, effects, questionable legality, and
inefficiencies. This Note then proposes potential avenues of
improvement to remove UEFA from its precarious situation and ensure
that the regulations are effective in accomplishing its stated goals.
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations have effectuated corporate
efficiency and effective governance amongst European football clubs.
1. See David Conn, Paris St-Germain signing of Kylian Mbappé looks like defiance of
Uefa, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/aug/30/
psg-kylian-mbappe-neymar-uefa-financial-fair-play [https://perma.cc/P97J-FREL]; see also
Most expensive transfers of all-time: Neymar, Mbappe, Pogba, Ronaldo and more, ESPN (July
10, 2018), http://www.espn.com/soccer/blog/soccer-transfers/3/post/2915603/most-expensivetransfers-of-all-time-neymar-mbappe-pogba-ronaldo-and-more (last visited Mar. 12, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/V9BM-KEF7] [hereinafter Most expensive transfers].; Currency converter
that
was
used
was:
Historic
Lookup,
X-RATES,
https://www.xrates.com/historical/?from=GBP&amount=160000000&date=2018-08-31
[https://perma.cc/QJ82-DQGF].
2. See Conn, supra note 1; Most expensive transfers, supra note 1.
3. See Conn, supra note 1; Most expensive transfers, supra note 1.
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This has yielded positive effects. Thus, this Note only calls for
modifications to FFP, not a complete overhaul or revocation.
Part II of this Note provides an introduction to UEFA, its
creation, subdivisions, and governing bodies. Part III reviews the
reasons for FFP’s promulgation, its purposes, and its governing
provisions. After reviewing FFP’s origins, purposes, and governing
provisions, Part IV of this Note analyzes the arguments in support of
FFP, discusses the political support FFP has received, and examines
the positive results since its implementation. Part V of this Note then
analyzes the severity of FFP’s legal flaws spurned by potential anticompetition claims and discusses the regulatory issues and oversights
that plague FFP. Finally, Part VI offers potential solutions to FFP’s
issues discussed in Part V.
II. UEFA’S ORIGIN AND STRUCTURE
A.

UEFA’s History

In 1954, UEFA was created as one of the six confederations
within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”),
the international governing body of football. 4 UEFA serves as an
association of associations. 5 It consists of fifty-five European national
football associations.6 Generally, each European country has one
national football association. 7 A nation’s football association is
comprised of its own leagues and regional associations. 8 The leagues
and regional associations are composed of the respective nation’s
football clubs. 9
UEFA’s listed objectives, amongst others, are to answer questions
relating to European football, to promote football, fair play, and good
governance, maintain relations with European football stakeholders,
4. See Valeria Kaplan, Comment: UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations and European
Union Antitrust Law Complications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 799, 800 (2015).
5. About UEFA, UEFA, http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/ [https://perma.cc/
3PAR-B4XX] (last visited May 14, 2018).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 803; MATTHEW HOLT, UEFA’S GOVERNANCE & THE
CONTROL OF CLUB COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 10 (2009), available at
http://www.sportbusinesscentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/UEFA1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GG3-A8TE].
9. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 803; HOLT, supra note 8, at 10.
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and support and safeguard its member associations “for the overall
well-being of the European game.” 10 UEFA is listed in the register of
companies under the Swiss Civil Code and is headquartered in Nyon,
Switzerland. 11
Figure 1: 12

One of UEFA’s primary functions is to administer the European
competitions. 13 The most important competitions that UEFA is tasked
with administering are the European Championship, Champions
League, and the Europa League. 14 These competitions rank closely in
ratings to the World Cup and provide tremendous revenue streams for
10. About UEFA, supra note 5.
11. See About UEFA, supra note 5; Zefix – Centeral Business Name Index, ZEFIX,
https://www.zefix.ch/en/search/entity/list?name=Union%20des%20Associations%20Europ%C
3%A9ennes%20de%20Football [https://perma.cc/56GS-Y3ZV] (last visited Mar. 31).
12. Suren Gomstsain et al., Between the Green Pitch and The Red Tape: The Private Legal
Order of FIFA, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 97-98 (2018).
13. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 802-03; see also Gomstsain, supra note 12, at 97-98.
14. Thomas Peeters & Stefan Szymanski, Financial Fair Play and Financial Crisis in
European Football 7 (Economic Policy Fifty-Eighth Panel Meeting supported by the Bank of
Lithuania, 2013).
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participants. 15 The European Championship, known as “The Euros,” is
the continental competition for all European national teams. 16 The
Champions League is the premier club football competition in the
world. 17 The Champions League participants are the top performing
teams in the highest leagues of each European country. 18 The Europa
League, though still a prominent tournament, is a subordinate
competition for teams that finished just below the top performing teams
in each league and half the clubs that are knocked out of the first round
of the Champions League. 19 In addition to performing well, qualifying
clubs are required to be licensed by UEFA. 20 However, as discussed in
Part III, compliance with FFP is a significant obstacle in obtaining such
license.
B.

UEFA’s Structure

UEFA acts through its “organs”: UEFA Congress, UEFA
Executive Committee, UEFA President, and sub-organs for the
administration of justice. 21 Any disputes that arise between UEFA and
associations, leagues, clubs, players, and officials may be dealt with by
the Court of Arbitration of Sport (“CAS”), which is based in Lausanne,
Switzerland. 22
UEFA Congress is UEFA’s leading control organ. 23 It holds a
congressional session each year and is attended by representatives from
each of UEFA’s fifty-five national member associations. 24 The UEFA
Executive Committee is the supreme executive body and is comprised
15. STEFANO DE ANGELIS, EXPLOITATION OF BRAND EQUITY IN FOOTBALL CLUBS
ACROSS COUNTRIES 19 (2016), available at https://tesi.luiss.it/18927/1/667311_DE%
20ANGELIS_STEFANO.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC2U-QPXB].
16.
European
Championship
Football
Tournament,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/sports/European-Championship [https://perma.cc/ADN2-2F2H]
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
17. See id.
18. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 805.
19. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 805.
20. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 805.
21. About UEFA, supra note 5.
22. About UEFA, supra note 5.
23. What UEFA does, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/what-uefadoes/ [https://perma.cc/VMV9-3UFR] (last updated Jan. 22, 2019); UEFA Congress, UEFA,
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/organisation/congress/ [https://perma.cc/JR5WE2TE] (last updated Feb. 13, 2019).
24. UEFA Congress, supra note 23.

2019]

FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY

1275

of the UEFA President, Aleksander Čeferin, and sixteen other
members. 25 The UEFA Executive Committee adopts regulations and is
the decision maker on all matters that do not fall into the purview of
the UEFA Congress or any other UEFA organ. 26 The UEFA President
represents the organization, serves as the chair of the UEFA Congress,
and meets with the UEFA Executive Committee. 27 In the event of a tie
in votes, the UEFA President has the casting vote. 28 It was this
committee that unanimously approved and passed FFP in 2009 under
famous former president Michel Platini. 29
The Organs for the Administration of Justice are UEFA’s
disciplinary bodies. 30. The formation of the Club Financial Control
Body (“CFCB”) was approved by the UEFA Executive Committee in
June 2012 to monitor the operation of the UEFA Club Licensing and
Financial Fair Play Regulations. 31 The CFCB replaced the Financial
Control Panel with the added capacity to adjudicate cases relating to
clubs’ compliance with FFP and to enforce the regulations. 32
CFCB decisions regarding FFP compliance are initially made via
its investigatory chamber. 33 Investigations can commence “ex officio”
or by request. 34 After the investigation is concluded, the investigators
have the authority to dismiss the case, enter into a Settlement
Agreement with the club, impose a warning and a fine up to a
maximum amount of EU€100,000, or refer the case to the Adjudicatory
Chamber. 35

25. UEFA Congress, supra note 23.
26. UEFA Congress, supra note 23.
27. UEFA President: Aleksander Čeferin, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/
about-uefa/president/ [https://perma.cc/YW57-EYBC] (last updated Jan. 22, 2019).
28. See id.
29. Protecting the Game, UEFA, https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-thegame/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/index.html [https://perma.cc/4WHR-YVC8] (last
visited May 14, 2018).
30. About UEFA, supra note 5. For purposes of this Note, the relevant disciplinary body
is the two-chamber Club Financial Control Body (“CFCB”).
31. Protecting the Game, supra note 29.
32. Protecting the Game, supra note 29.
33. Protecting the Game, supra note 29.
34. Club
Financial
Control
Body
Investigatory
Chamber,
UEFA,
http://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/disciplinary/club-financial-controlling-body/investigatorychamber/index.html?redirectFromOrg=true [https://perma.cc/8NM6-N6BH] (last visited May
14, 2018).
35. See id.
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The Adjudicatory Chamber decides on cases that are either
referred to it by the investigator or on request by a directly affected
party. 36 Decisions are made by a simple majority. 37 The Adjudicatory
Chamber has the authority to either dismiss the case, accept or reject
the clubs admission to a UEFA competition, impose disciplinary
measures, or to affirm, reject, or modify a decision by an investigator.38
Disciplinary measures that the Adjudicatory Chamber can impose
include: a warning, fine, deduction of league points, withholding of
revenues from a UEFA competition, suspension of registering new
players for UEFA competitions, imposing a cap on the number of
players that a club can register to participate in a UEFA competition,
disqualification from present or future competitions, and in the most
severe cases, withdrawal of a title or award. 39 All decisions are
published. 40
III. FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS’ GENESIS,
PURPOSES, AND PROVISIONS
A.

Reasons for Financial Fair Play Regulations

All clubs hope to find themselves fighting for a chance to enter
the Champions League or Europa League because of the financial gain
it produces for each participant. 41 In 2015, every team that participated
in the groups stage (the opening round) of the Champions League
earned approximately EU€12 million. 42 Additionally, a club earned an
extra EU€1.5 million for every win and EU€500,000 for every loss. 43
If a club made it to the next round, it earned EU€5.5 million.44
Advancement to the quarterfinals led to an additional earning of EU€6
million and semifinalists earned EU€7 million. 45 Winners of the
tournament took an additional EU€15 million while the runner up took
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Protecting the Game, supra note 29.
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 805.
See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 805-06; De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.

2019]

FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY

1277

home an additional EU€10.5 million. 46 Ultimately, the total earnings
for the winning club was approximately EU€54.5 million. 47 Though
less than that of the Champions League, the potential revenue in the
Europa League is still significant. In 2015, participation in the group
stage earned EU€2.6 million, with an additional EU€360,000 for every
win, and EU€120,000 for every draw. 48 A club earned EU€500,000 if
it made it through the group stage, EU€750,000 if it made it to the
round of sixteen, EU€1 million for the quarterfinals, and EU€1.6
million for a semifinals appearance. 49 The champion earned an
additional EU€6.5, while the runner up earned EU€3.5. 50 Thus, the
potential maximum income for a Europa League participant in 2015
was EU€15.71 million.51
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations are limited to teams that
choose to compete in its competitions. 52 However, because both
European competitions are lucrative, major clubs from every
association aspire to qualify for them. 53 Nevertheless, for those teams
that do not have a probable chance of entering the tournament, the
associations have passed similar rules to prevent financial
mismanagement and ensure clubs’ viability. 54
The UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations were spurned by the
threat of failing European football clubs. Clubs became less risk averse
in their spending in an attempt to qualify for the prestigious
tournaments, which in turn would improve revenue. 55 Many of these
clubs took on significant debt and irresponsibly spent large sums of
money to bring in players. 56 Many clubs took gambles on acquiring
players and incurred exorbitant transfer fees and salaries, which they
could not afford given their normal revenues, with the hope that on the
field success would follow and revenues would increase to a point
46. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
47. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
48. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
49. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
50. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
51. See De Angelis, supra note 15, at 19.
52. Samuel Kilb, Fixing Financial Fair Play: How to Make European Soccer’s Salary
Cap Stick, 1 INDON. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 808, 811 (2014).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 807.
56. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 807.
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where their costs would be covered. 57 Such poor corporate
mismanagement and risk-taking led to poor financial health for large
clubs. 58
Reports from 2009 showed that two-thirds of the clubs in
England’s top two leagues spent more than seventy percent of their
revenues on player wages. 59 To put this into context, American
professional sports teams spend approximately fifty percent of their
revenues on player wages. 60 As a result of such reckless spending, there
were approximately forty formal insolvencies of professional English
football clubs from 2000 to 2015. 61 This does not include clubs that
avoided formal insolvency due to deferred payment arrangements. 62
Financial distress was prevalent throughout European football.
For example, Valencia Club de Fútbol (“Valencia CF”), a prominent
Spanish football club, experienced day-to-day operational issues due to
poor financial management and excessive debt. 63 Glasgow Rangers
Football Club (“Rangers FC”), was one of the most famous clubs in the
world, and one of the two most successful clubs in Scotland. 64 Poor
financial management led to the team’s ultimate dissolution and
reformation in 2012. 65 Once one of the premier teams in the world,
Rangers F.C. played in Scotland’s fourth tier division for the 2012-13
season and left Celtic Glasgow Football Club (“Celtic FC”), their
crosstown rival, with a monopoly-like control on the Scottish Premier
League. 66 Due to the lack of competition, the Scottish Premiership
became predictable, which in turn led to lower fan turnout and bottom
line pressure throughout the league. 67

57. Mark Hovell & Tiran Gunawardena, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations: Saving
Football from Itself, 32 ENT. & SPORT L. 37, 38 (2015).
58. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 807.
59. See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
60. See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
61. See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
62. See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
63. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 807.
64. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810.
65. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810.
66. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810.
67. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810 ; see generally Chris Davies, Labour Market Controls
and Sport in Light of UEFA’ Financial Fair Play Regulations, 33 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
443 (2012).
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In 2012, European football clubs totaled EU€2.036 billion in
This was an increase of EU€453 million from 2009 and up a
resounding 153% from 2008. 69 According to UEFA, in 2010, more
than fifty percent of all top division clubs in Europe were operating at
a loss. 70 For twenty-eight percent of clubs, player salaries constituted
more than 120% of revenue. 71 This was largely due to the increase in
player wages, which was fueled by excessive risk-taking by the football
clubs. 72 In Italy, there was tremendous financial chaos and poor
management. 73 From 1996 to 2007 there was an accumulated loss of
approximately EU€951 million, and from 1996 to 2002, there was an
increase in player salaries of more than 700 percent amongst the top six
clubs. 74 Many of the Italian clubs faced issues of indebtedness and
incapacity to refinance debt. 75 However, despite operational
dysfunction, these clubs experienced high survival rates due to either
owner bailouts, also known as “sugar daddies,” or because creditors
accepted debt arrears and non-payment of debt. 76 These wealthy
benefactors injected additional revenues, either through equity or by
debt, to help cover the losses caused by these speculative player
investments. 77
With such ownership safeguards, club managers were not
incentivized to manage costs and became dependent on wealthy owners
to cover mistakes. 78 As a result, wealthy benefactors’ continuous cash
debt. 68

68. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810; J. Christian Muller et al., The Financial Fair Play
Regulations of UEFA: An Adequate Concept to Ensure the Long-Term Viability and
Sustainability of European Club Football?, 7 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 117, 119 (2012).
69. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 810.
70. Rasmus K. Storm & Klaus Nielsen, Profit Maximization, Win Optimization and Soft
Budget Constraints in Professional Team Sports, 12 EUR. SPORT MGMT. Q. 1 (2012).
71. See id.
72. See Top footballers’ wages rise 1,500% in 20 years, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/aug/20/footballers-wages-rise-tickets
[https://perma.cc/H9UH-VNVZ] [hereinafter Rise in Footballers’ Wages].
73. Storm & Nielsen, supra note 70 at 6; see also Stephen Morrow, Impression
Management in Football Club Financial Reporting, INT’L J. OF SPORT FIN., 1, 16-17 (2006)
74. Storm & Nielsen, supra note 70 at 6. Conversion to euro was done using the following
website: Historical Converter, FXTOP, http://fxtop.com/en/historical-currency-converter.
php?A=1400000000&C1=USD&C2=EUR&DD=31&MM=12&YYYY=2007&B=1&P=&I=
1&btnOK=Go%21 [https://perma.cc/AT2X-7FDY] (last visited March 12, 2019).
75. See Storm & Nielsen, supra note 70.
76. See Storm & Nielsen, supra note 70 at 10.
77. Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
78. See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
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injections promoted risky player investments. 79 It became evident that
sugar daddies contributed to the financial deterioration of these football
clubs because the safety blanket they provided undermined the need for
risk aversion and financial prudence. 80 Unfortunately for many clubs
who relied on wealthy benefactors, there came a breaking point where
the benefactors could no longer cover the deficits. 81 This caused the
respective clubs to plummet into financial chaos. 82 In Italy and
England, large successful clubs were forced to undergo financial
restructurings, ownership reshuffling, and large player sales to service
the debt load after the once dependent owners found it difficult to
continue to provide stop-gap funding. 83 In response, the primary
objectives of FFP were the tempering of risky player investment and
mitigation of football clubs’ reliance on wealthy benefactors. 84
B.

Financial Fair Play Regulations’ Purposes

In response to the financial issues with European clubs, UEFA
promulgated FFP with the following stated purposes:
1. To improve the economic and financial capabilities of the
clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility;
2. To place the necessary importance on the protection of
creditors and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with
employees, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually;
3. To introduce more discipline and rationality in club football
finances;
4. To encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own
revenues;
5. To encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit
of football; and
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Kilb, supra note 52, at 815.
See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815.
Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
See Hovell & Gunawardena, supra note 57, at 38.
See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also Why has Inter Milan been sold to Thohir?,
NEWSTALK (Oct. 16. 2013), http://www.newstalk.com/Why-has-Inter-Milan-been-sold-toThohir [https://perma.cc/3WZG-662C].
84. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also UEFA, CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL
FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS annex X (2015), available at https://www.uefa.com/Multimedia
Files/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/26/77/91/2267791_DOWNLOAD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UKP6-8EN9] [hereinafter UEFA CLUB LICENSING].
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6. To protect the long-term viability and sustainability of
European club football. 85

C. Relevant Financial Fair Play Regulations
1. Applicability, Disclosure Requirements, and Prohibition of
Overdue Payables
Football clubs qualifying for UEFA competitions on sporting
merit (i.e., national league success) generally must obtain a license
issued by their licensor, a UEFA national association (e.g., the Italian
Football Association), in accordance with the national association’s
licensing regulations. 86 Additionally, each license applicant must
confirm that they will abide by and observe the UEFA Club Licensing
and Financial Fair Play Regulations. 87 Applicants must also authorize
UEFA to examine relevant documents and execute compliance
audits. 88
In the pursuit of transparency, UEFA also requires the release of
the identity of any party that has a direct or indirect controlling position
in the license applicant. 89 Any party that has a ten percent or greater
direct or indirect ownership, or significant influence of the club must
be identified. 90 UEFA defines “significant influence” as the ability to
influence but not control financial and operating policy. 91 Moreover,
parties are deemed to have significant influence if they provide an
amount equivalent to thirty percent or more of the licensee’s total
revenue in a reporting period. 92 For further financial disclosure, the
granting of a license requires the applicant to prepare and submit
financial information that demonstrates the club’s ability to continue as
a going concern until the end of the license season. 93 Such financial
information includes a budgeted profit and loss account, statement of
cash flow, and explanatory notes regarding significant assumptions. 94
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84 art. 2.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 14.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 43.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 43
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 46.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 46
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 13.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 13.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 52.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 52.
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One column of FFP is represented through Articles 49 to 50b,
which prohibits clubs from having overdue payables. 95 Article 49
prohibits football clubs from having overdue payables towards other
football clubs as a result of a player transfer. 96 Here, payables are
defined to include the amounts due to football clubs for players’ rights,
training compensation, and other payments contracted between the
clubs. 97 A payable is considered overdue if it is not paid according to
the agreed terms between the clubs. 98 The license applicant must also
prove that it has no overdue payables to its employees, such as wages,
salaries, image rights, bonuses, and other benefits. 99 Finally, UEFA
also requires that the applicant must prove that it has no overdue
payables towards social or tax authorities resulting from a contractual
or legal obligation. 100 Such regulations were the fulcrum for UEFA’s
denial of Italian Club Parma’s license application. 101
2. The Break-Even Requirement
The second, more controversial column of FFP is Article 58’s
break-even requirement. 102 The break-even rule prohibits clubs from
incurring “relevant expenses” greater than their “relevant income.”103
In other words, clubs cannot spend more than they make. The breakeven analysis measures the difference between relevant income and
relevant expenses over three-year intervals. 104 For example, in
determining a club’s compliance with the break-even requirement for
a UEFA competition that commences in 2018 and ends in 2019, a
club’s annual income and expenses for the reporting periods ending in

95. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, arts. 49-50b.
96. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 49.
97. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 49.
98. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex VIII.
99. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 50.
100. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 50(b).
101. See Myfanwy Garman, Parma denied UEFA licence, GOAL, http://www.
goal.com/en-sg/news/3951/europa-league/2014/05/21/4830716/parma-denied-uefa-licence
[https://perma.cc/3DL7-EYQQ] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019); see also Ben Gladwell, Parma
declared bankrupt, face relegation to amateur leagues, ESPN (Jun. 22. 2015),
http://www.espn.com/soccer/parma/story/2500817/parma-declared-bankrupt-will-berelegated-to-amateur-leagues [https://perma.cc/R2DR-7H8L].
102. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 58.
103. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 58.
104. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 58.
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2018, 2017, and 2016 will be evaluated. 105 For a UEFA competition
that commences the following year, 2019, the CFCB will evaluate the
club’s annual income and expenses for the reporting periods ending in
2019, 2018, and 2017. 106 In evaluating clubs’ relevant income and
expenses over the relevant periods, FFP provides an acceptable deficit
for compliance with the break-even requirement. 107 The acceptable
deficit is EU€5 million but can exceed this level up to EU€30 million
if such excess spending is entirely covered by contributions from equity
participants or related parties. 108
“Relevant income” includes gate receipts, sponsorship and
advertising income, broadcasting rights, commercial activities,
tournament prize money, other operating income (e.g., membership
fees), and profits from player sales. 109 However, UEFA requires that
relevant income be adjusted (decreased) if any of these items include
income generating transactions with related parties above fair value.110
“Relevant expenses” are defined as the sum of the cost of sales or
material, employee benefit expenses, and the costs of acquiring player
registration. 111 Relevant expenses must be adjusted (increased) if any
expense transaction with related parties is below fair value. 112 Such
transactions include any expense transaction where a related party’s
goods and services are provided to the licensee or where employee
benefit expenses (e.g., player wages and costs) are incurred by a related
party despite the employee participating in club activities. 113 However,
relevant expenses may be decreased if any of the listed expenses
include spending on youth development, community development
activities, or finance costs attributable to the construction or substantial
modification of tangible fixed assets. 114
Permitted contributions from equity partners include their
payments for shares from the club’s share reserve accounts.115
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See generally UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 59.
See generally UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 59.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 61.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 61.
UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
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Permitted contributions from a related party include capital received as
an unconditional gift made to the club with no obligation of repayment
or any other form of consideration from the club. 116 An example of a
permitted related party contribution is a waiver of a debt owed to a
related party. 117 Another example of a permitted related party
contribution is the difference between the reported value of a related
party transaction and the estimated fair value of the transaction.118
These contributions from equity partners and related parties are only
permitted to fund a deficit that is EU€30 million or less. 119 However,
these contributions are excluded from “relevant income” in the initial
break-even calculation. 120 The break-even requirement is not met if the
club has an aggregate break-even deficit exceeding EU€30 million,
regardless of any contribution from related parties or equity partners.121
3. Related Party Transactions
UEFA’s required adjustment for related party transactions is a
direct response to clubs’ past dependence on wealthy benefactors and
a result of UEFA’s focus on limiting such dependence. 122 Therefore, it
seems appropriate to break down UEFA’s related party provisions. A
related party is defined as a person or entity that is related to the
licensee (the football club). 123 When determining whether the party is
related to the licensee, the focus is not solely on the legal relationship
but “the substance of the relationship.” 124 A person is considered
related to the club if that person has “control or joint control” over the
club, has “significant influence” on the club, or is a “key management”
member of the club or the club’s parent entity. 125 Additionally, close
members of that person’s family are also considered related to the
116. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
117. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
118. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X (emphasis added).
119. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 61, annex X.
120. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
121. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, art. 61, 63.
122. See Christopher A. Flannagan, A Tricky European Fixture: An Assessment of UEFA’s
Financial Fair Play Regulations and Their Compatibility with EU Law, 13 INT’L SPORTS L.J.
148, 150 (2013); see also Kilb supra note 52, at 815-16; Egon Franck & Markus Lang, A
Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs, 61
SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 430, 438 (2014).
123. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
124. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
125. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
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football club under FFP. 126 Annex X provides that close members of
that person’s family are considered to be “those family members who
may be expected to influence, or be influenced by, that person in his
dealings with the entity, including that person’s children and spouse or
domestic partner, children of that person’s spouse or domestic partner,
and dependents of that person or that person’s spouse or domestic
partner.” 127 An entity is related to the club if the entity and club are
“members of the same group” (like in a parent to subsidiary
relationship or subsidiary to subsidiary relationship), the entity has
significant influence over the club, the entity and the club are
controlled, jointly controlled, or significantly influenced by the same
government, or the entity is controlled by a related person of the club
as previously defined. 128 Furthermore, the entity is deemed to be related
if the entity and the club are controlled or jointly controlled, or
significantly influenced by the same government. 129
A related party transaction is defined as a “transfer of resources,
services, or obligations between related parties, regardless of whether
the price has been charged.” 130 “Fair value” for a transaction is defined
as the amount for which an “asset could be exchanged or a liability
settled, between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s length
negotiation.” 131 When such related party transactions occur, the club
must submit its determination of its fair value. 132 In situations where
the fair value of the related party transaction is investigated by the
CFCB, an independent third party assessor will perform a fair value
assessment of the transaction under standard market practices and
assign a fair value to the related party transaction. 133 Where the CFCB’s
estimated fair value is different than the club’s proposed value, the
relevant income or expense must be adjusted to represent the value
estimated by the CFCB. 134 UEFA has identified common examples of
related party transactions: revenue from sponsorship arrangements,
revenue from hospitality tickets or use of executive boxes, and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X (emphasis added).
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.

1286 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

transactions with a related party where goods or services are provided
by the club. 135
IV. SUPPORT FOR FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY
A. Financial Arguments in Favor of FFP
There are three prominent arguments in support of FFP’s
restrictions on clubs’ spending and owners’ capital injections. 136 First,
eliminating potential bailouts from wealthy owners makes clubs more
risk averse because they do not have the backstop of a sugar daddy cash
infusion. 137 This leads to more cautious investments and more in-depth
evaluations of players before making a purchase. 138 FFP also reduces
the risk of other club managers following suit in an attempt to better
compete against teams that are lavishly spending. 139 Consequently, by
limiting the security blanket that equity partner investments and related
party transactions provide, club managers will act more responsibly,
and the risk of compounding financial imprudence from other
managers following suit is prevented.
Second, FFP’s handcuffing of rich benefactors from directly
injecting capital incentivizes investment in stadiums, infrastructure,
and youth community development. 140 FFP incentivizes wealthy
owners to invest in such projects because the future revenue generated
from such investments are permissible forms of revenue under the
break-even requirement. 141 Moreover, the expenses that a club incurs
in developing such projects are not included on the expense side of the
analysis. 142 These investments produce real assets that ensure the
clubs’ longevity. As a result, it converts the potentially volatile income

135. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X.
136. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; Franck & Lang, supra note 123, at 438.
137. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84,
annex X.
138. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; Franck & Lang, supra note 123, at 438.
139. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815.
140. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815.
141. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84,
annex X.
142. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84, annex X; see also Kilb, supra note 52,
at 815; see also Franck & Lang, supra note 123, at 438.
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from the benefactor into stable and more dependable income from real
assets. 143
Third, by incentivizing such investments and blocking direct
owner investment, FFP forces owners to gain “the aura of being
‘virtuous owners’” in the eyes of the consumers because they are
incentivized to invest into the surrounding community. 144 Teams that
establish this aura will likely see a jump in fan approval, which leads
to greater fan turnout, viewership, and ultimately, revenue. 145
B. Political Support for UEFA
In 2009, the European Commission highlighted that a licensing
system, like UEFA’s FFP, may be viewed as necessary for the
functioning of the European sports model and that the primary aim of
the financial criteria for licensing regulatory programs is to ensure the
viability of clubs within sporting competitions. 146 In 2011, the
European Commission expressly stated that legitimate objectives of
sport regulatory organizations include the procurement of financial
stability of sports clubs. 147 UEFA also prudently sought counsel from
the European Commission as the regulations were being developed.148
Andrea Traverso, then Head of Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play,
confirmed that UEFA had a series of consultations with the European
Commission to ensure that FFP complied with EU law. 149 In 2012, the
European Commission issued a joint statement with UEFA supporting
FFP. 150 In their joint statement, they stated that FFP’s objective was
143. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also Franck & Lang, supra note 123, at 438.
144. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 815; see also UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 84,
annex X.
145. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815–16.
146. Stefano Bastianon, The Striani Challenge to UEFA Financial Fair-Play. A New Era
After Bosman or Just a Washout?, 11 COMPETITION L. REV 7, 29 (2015).
147. See id. at 29-30.
148. Neil Dunbar, The Union of European Football Association’s Club Licensing and
Financial Fair Play Regulations - Are They Working?, SPORTS L. E.J. at 6 (Aug. 19. 2015),
https://slej.scholasticahq.com/article/6412-the-union-of-european-football-association-s-clublicensing-and-financial-fair-play-regulations-are-they-working [https://perma.cc/A4PJ-XLFX].
149. Daniel Geey, The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: A Difficult Balancing Act, 9
E.S.L.J. 50, 60 (2011).
150. Kaplan, supra note 4; Joint Statement by Vice-President Joaquin Almunia and
President Michel Platini (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
sectors/sports/joint_statement_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR9Y-KZ5R]; Letter from Michel
Platini, President, UEFA to Joaquin Almunia,Vice-President, European Commission (Mar. 21,
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ensuring that football clubs stand on their own by implementing sound
corporate governance methods. 151 In 2014, European Commissioner,
Androulla Vassiliou, strongly supported FFP because it improved
transparency and governance standards. 152 On April 3, 2014, Vice
President of the European Commission and the Commissioner for
Competition, Joaquín Almunia, reaffirmed his support for FFP, citing
its objective to safeguard the financial health of European football.153
However, the joint statement only mentions how FFP furthers the
European Union’s policy in the field of state aid and does not address
FFP’s competition law issues. 154 The following October, UEFA and
the European Commission entered into a formal “Arrangement for
Cooperation” for a term of three years. 155 Paragraph 2.7 of the
cooperative agreement stated that the regulations “contribute to the
sustainable development and healthy growth of sport in Europe.”156
The cooperative agreement was renewed and signed in February 2018,
and was intended to build upon the previous agreement. 157
C. Effectiveness of the Regulations on Financial Management
According to a 2015 UEFA study, net football club debt fell from
sixty-five percent of revenue in 2009 to forty percent of revenue in
2015. 158 The study also showed that combined bottom-line losses
2012), available at http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/EuropeanUnion/
01/77/21/75/1772175_DOWNLOAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ37-85K8].
151. Dunbar, supra note 148, at 6; Commissioner Almunia reaffirms financial fair play
support, UEFA (Apr. 3. 2014), https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/clublicensing-and-financial-fair-play/news/newsid=2083789.html [https://perma.cc/6ZMJ-KWFK]
[hereinafter Almunia Reaffirmation].
152. Tom Serby, The State of EU Sports Law: Lessons from UEFA’s ‘Financial Fair Play’
Regulations, 16 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 37, 38 (2016).
153. See Dunbar, supra note 148, at 6; see also Joaquín Almunia, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/almunia/about/cv/index_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/6RC6-6A8Q] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
154. Kaplan, supra note 4.
155. Dunbar, supra note 148, at 6.
156. Dunbar, supra note 148, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Press Release, European Commission, European Commission and UEFA Consolidate
Cooperation (Feb. 21, 2018), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18901_en.htm [https://perma.cc/E9UJ-AFRX].
158. UEFA, CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING REPORT 119 (2015), available at
https://es.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/42/27/91/2422791_D
OWNLOAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVM3-XSJF] [hereinafter 2015 UEFA CLUB
BENCHMARKING].
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decreased 81% since the introduction of FFP. 159 Clubs also
experienced operating profits of EU€1.5 billion in the two years prior
to the study, which is a dramatic turnaround when compared to the
EU€700 million losses in the two years prior to FFP’s introduction.160
Deloitte reported that the 2013-14 season’s overall wages to revenue
ratio fell to fifty-nine percent across the five largest leagues. 161 This
was its lowest level since 1999-2000. 162 Since the implementation of
FFP, European clubs’ revenues increased 6% in 2013, 6% in 2014, and
9.5% from 2015 to 2016. 163 This has largely been spurred by an
increase in television and broadcasting revenues. 164 There has also been
an increase in revenue from UEFA club competitions. 165 The large
clubs have also experienced more sponsorship and commercial
revenue. 166
Clubs have also incurred wage growth of approximately 8.6%
from 2015-2016. 167 Note that this figure is below the 2015-2016
revenue growth rate of 9.5%, indicating that clubs are being financially
prudent. 168 A key financial indicator of the health of football clubs,
according to UEFA, is the wage to revenue ratio. 169 Per UEFA reports,
this ratio decreased from 63% to 62.5% from 2015 to 2016. 170 Over the
six-year span from 2010 to 2016, the ratio was at a peak of 65.2% in
2012, but declined to 62.1% in 2014, and has remained below 63.5%
in 2015 and 2016.. 171 Nevertheless, wages have increased
approximately 40% from EU€8.2 billion in 2010 to EU€11.5 billion in
159. See id. at 106.
160. See id.
161. Serby, supra note 152, at 43; DELOITTE, DELOITTE ANNUAL REVIEW OF FOOTBALL
FINANCE 2015 9 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents
/sports-business-group/deloitte-uk-arff-2015-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6YJ-YZHL].
162. Serby, supra note 152, at 43; ; DELOITTE, DELOITTE ANNUAL REVIEW OF FOOTBALL
FINANCE , supra note 161, at 9.
163. UEFA, CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING REPORT 62 (2016), available at
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/Clublicensing/0
2/53/00/22/2530022_DOWNLOAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVM3-XSJF] [hereinafter 2016
UEFA CLUB BENCHMARKING].
164. See id. at 64
165. See id. at 68.
166. See id. at 73-75.
167. See id. at 81.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 82.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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2016. 172 Additionally, club operating costs, excluding wages, have
increased at a record eight percent among the top twenty clubs in
2016. 173 This supports the conclusion that FFP is helping clubs focus
their spending away from players and towards expanding their brand,
improving future revenue streams. 174 Finally, in regard to overall club
profitability, clubs in 2016 experienced a record aggregate operating
profit of EU€832 million before including transfer costs.175
Approximately half of the top-division leagues reported aggregate
bottom line profits in 2016. 176 After transfer costs have been included,
combined bottom-line losses have decreased by eighty-four percent
since the introduction of FFP in 2011. 177 In 2010, bottom line losses
were approximately EU€1.6 billion. 178 In 2016, the bottom line losses
were EU€262 million. 179 Such improvement has been largely driven by
improved club operating profits. 180 2016 Club operating profits reached
a record of EU€832 million. 181 In the three year period from 2014 to
2016 clubs earned operating profits of EU€2.3, which is a dramatic
difference from the approximately EU€800 million earned from 2010
to 2012 These metrics show that FFP has improved football club
efficiency and independence. With improved operating profits, clubs
will be able to continue independently financing their operations while
also participating in the transfer market. 182
FFP also had a positive impact on football clubs’ balance sheets.
Club investments in stadiums and other fixed assets exceeded EU€1
billion for the first time on record. 183 These figures stem from the
record level of stadium investment in 2016.184 Furthermore, there is
still room for more investment as only twenty percent of European
clubs own the stadiums they play in. 185 Recall that FFP provides that
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id. at 83.
See id. at 91
See id. at 91.
See id. at 100.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 102.
See id.
See id at 101.
See id.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 113.
See id. at 117.
See id. at 115.
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such investments are not included as relevant expenses in the breakeven analysis. 186 Such figures support the proposition that FFP
incentivizes investments that procure future revenue, which in turn
ensures the viability of football clubs. 187 The record number of
investment in fixed assets evidences that FFP’s incentive structure is
effective. 188
One of the most encouraging signals is the decline in football
clubs’ net debt. 189 UEFA defines net debt as the sum of net borrowing
(i.e., bank overdrafts, loans, and accounts payable) and net player
transfer balance (i.e., the net account receivable and payable from
player transfers). 190 From 2010 to 2016, the combined net debt of
Europe’s top division clubs decreased from sixty percent of revenue to
thirty-five percent of revenue. 191 Since FFP’s introduction, clubs’ net
assets (assets less liabilities) have doubled. 192 This doubling is a direct
result of FFP’s limitations on spending and incentives for investment
in fixed assets. 193
V. FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY FLAWS
A. Anti-Competition Legal Claims
The major anti-competition claim against UEFA is argued under
Article 101 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”), which was formerly known as Article 81 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”). 194 UEFA is the
only organization establishing European-wide football competitions.195
Thus, it dominates the European football market which creates the

186. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex X.
187. Kilb, supra note 52, at 815.
188. 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 113.
189. See 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 113.
190. See 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 121.
191. See 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 121
192. See 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 124.
193. See 2016 UEFA Club Benchmarking, supra note 163, at 124.
194. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88, [hereinafter TFEU]; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, Dec.
7, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (as in effect 2009) (now TFEU art. 101) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
195. Kaplan, supra note 4.

1292 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

opportunity for FFP to be challenged under either Article 101(1).196
Article 101(1) states that European competition law prohibits all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.197
Article 101(1) specifically prohibits agreements that directly or
indirectly fix prices or trading conditions, or agreements that limit or
controls production, markets, technical development, or investment.198
The legal claims generally argue that FFP’s financial constraints
violate Article 101(1)(a), which prohibits direct or indirect fixing of
purchasing or selling prices, or Article 101(1)(b) which prohibits
agreements or decisions that limit investment. 199
Studies support the contention that FFP’s break-even requirement
protects the large and established pre-FFP clubs and can be considered
a barrier to entry for smaller clubs because of its limitations on
investment.200 FFP has unsurprisingly garnered support from Europe’s
largest clubs. 201 It is noteworthy the fact that these larger clubs have
tremendous political and financial leverage. 202 The large clubs
threatened to break away from UEFA and form their own super
league. 203 UEFA would be unable to prevent clubs or players from
joining such a competition under Article 102 of the TFEU. 204 Lack of
participation from Europe’s elite clubs would presumably cause a
decrease in UEFA’s viewership and revenue and consequently, its
dissolution. 205

196. See id at 799; Antitrust Overview, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 16, 2012) http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/overview_en.html [https://perma.cc/94XK-P2T9].
197. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 799; TFEU supra note 194, art. 101.
198. TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101.
199. Serby, supra note 152, at 44.
200. Serby, supra note 152, at 44.
201. Jean-Louis Dupont, Football’s Anticompetitive Streak, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578357992271428024
[https://perma.cc/9UQ7-VCGK].
202. See id.
203. Serby, supra note 152, at 44.
204. See Serby, supra note 152, at 44.
205. See Serby, supra note 152, at 44.
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1. Past Anti-Competition Claims
In 2013, Jean-Louis Dupont filed two complaints on behalf of
player-agent Daniel Striani. 206 One complaint was filed with the
European Commission requesting an investigation into UEFA’s breakeven requirement, and a second complaint was filed with the Brussels
Court of First Instance arguing that FFP, in particular the break-even
requirement, restricted competition. 207 Specifically, Dupont argued
that FFP restricted investment, reduced the number of transfers, and
reinforced the current market structure. 208 FFP fortifies the current
market structure, he argued, because the break-even rules do not have
any exceptions for clubs that are smaller, less established, and compete
in the less prestigious and lucrative national leagues (i.e., leagues
outside of Spain, England, Germany, Italy, France, and Portugal).209
The smaller clubs are hit harder than the larger clubs because they are
restricted from investing in their long-term success. 210 In other words,
FFP causes small clubs to remain small and protects the large
established clubs from new competition. 211 Dupont claimed that due to
its breach of EU competition law, UEFA must prove that FFP serves a
legitimate and necessary objective and that they are the least restrictive
means of achieving its goals under Meca-Medina v. Commission and
Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten. 212 This is similar to constitutional strict scrutiny applied in
the United States. 213 Unfortunately, EU courts have failed to decide on
the merits of such challenges. 214
206. See Serby, supra note 152, at 38; Dupont, supra note 201; see also Bastianon, supra
note 146, at 17.
207. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 8.
208. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; see also Dupont, supra note 201.
209. Dupont, supra note 201.
210. See Dupont, supra note 201.
211. See Dupont, supra note 201.
212. See Dupont, supra note 201.; see also C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006
E.C.R. I-7006; C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577.
213. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny).
214. See generally Ben Van Rompuy, The Brussels Court judgment on Financial Fair
Play: a futile attempt to pull off a Bosman., ASSER INT’L SPORTS L. BLOG (Jul. 6, 2015),
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-brussels-court-judgment-on-financial-fair-playa-futile-attempt-to-pull-off-a-bosman-by-ben-van-rompuy [https://perma.cc/A433-2NEJ]; see
also Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, ¶ 80 (2016). In Galatasaray, the Court of
Arbitration for Sport decided on such claims in applying Article 101. However, this is not a EU
court. See generally Galatasaray, CAS 2016/A/4492.
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The European Commission was not obligated to carry out the
requested investigation. 215 Given the European Commission’s past
political support for FFP in stating that the regulations are consistent
“with the aims and objectives of EU policy in the field of State Aid,” a
finding against UEFA would likely have caused political
embarrassment. 216 In 2014, pursuant to Article 7(1) of Commission
Regulation 773/2004, 217 the European Commission issued a letter
stating its intention to reject the claim because the case was ongoing in
the Brussels court. 218 The European Commission listed three
procedural reasons for the rejection. 219 First, the European Commission
stated that Striani lacked standing to lodge the complaint as only legal
persons, who can demonstrate that they are “directly and adversely
affected” by the claimed infringement, can issue a complaint.220
Second, the European Commission reasoned that Striani, because of
his filing in the Brussels Court of First Instance, could secure requested
protection before a national court. 221 Third, the European Commission
posited that it had only received one complaint regarding FFP. 222 In
response, Dupont argued that the first and third reasons for rejection
were baseless because FFP directly affected player agents due to a
decline in transfers and, in response to the third justification, submitted
three other complaints against FFP. 223 However, in October 2014, the
European Commission formally rejected the complaint solely on its
second justification, finding that the Brussels Court of First Instance
was “well-placed” to deal with the complaint, and sufficiently defend
Striani’s rights. 224 The European Commission’s decision left the

215. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214.
216. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214.
217. Commission Regulation 773/2004 of Apr. 7, 2004, Relating to the Conduct of
Proceeding by the Commission Pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2004 O.J. (L
123) 18, 7.
218. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; see also Case AT.40105 UEFA Financial Fair Play
Rules, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/
40105/40105_220_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBH9-RH6F].
219. Van Rompuy, supra note 214.
220. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214.; Bastianon, supra note 146 at 18-19.
221. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214; See Bastianon, supra note 146 at 18-19.
222. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214.
223. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214; Bastianon, supra note 146 at 18-19.
224. See Van Rompuy, supra note 214; Bastianon, supra note 146 at 25.
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Brussels Court of First Instance as the only remaining avenue for a
decision on the merits. 225
In 2015, the Brussels Court of First Instance declared itself
“incompetent” to deal with the complaint because it lacked
jurisdiction. 226 Specifically, because UEFA is an association listed in
the register of companies under Articles 60 and 61 of the Swiss Civil
Code, it is a legal person under Swiss law. 227 Therefore, the proper
jurisdiction for the claim was Switzerland because persons domiciled
in a State bound by the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(“Lugano Convention”) (i.e., Switzerland) can only be sued in the
courts of that State. 228 Also, the Brussels Court held that it was not
possible to invoke Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention, which
permits tort claims to be brought in the place where the harm occurred
(i.e., Belgium), because the addressees of FFP are only the clubs, not
player agents. 229 Consequently, Striani’s incurred harm was considered
indirect and too attenuated to fall under Article 5(3) of the Lugano
Convention. 230
The Brussels Court of First Instance, however, submitted the
question of whether the FFP regulations violated Articles 101 to the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) for a preliminary
ruling. 231 The court also imposed an interim order to prevent the
225. See generally Van Rompuy, supra note 214; Bastianon, supra note 146 at 25.
226. See generally Van Rompuy, supra note 214; Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26;
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Code Civil [CC], Codice Civil [CC] [Civil Code] Dec.
10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, arts. 60-61 (Switz.), available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/
classified-compilation/19070042/index.html#id-ni2-ni6-ni8
[https://perma.cc/LJ3V-A642]
[hereinafter Swiss Civil Code].
227. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26; Swiss Civil Code, supra note 226, arts. 60-61.
228. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Switz.-Eur., art. 3, Dec. 21, 2007,
2007 O.J. (L 339) art. 3 [hereinafter Convention on Jurisdiction] supra note 227. Article 3 of the
Convention on Jurisdiction states that “Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in
the courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of
this Title.” The reason why Switzerland was the appropriate jurisdiction for this claim was
because the claim did not fall into the exceptions (in Sections 2-6) to this general rule that the
claim must be filed in the state in which the defendant is domiciled which is in Section 1 of
Article 3 of the Convention on Jurisdiction. See Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 228, art.
3.
229. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26.
230. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26.
231. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; see also TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101.
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implementation of the second phase of FFP, where the acceptable
deficit would be reduced from EU€45 million to EU€30 million, until
the CJEU delivered an opinion on the submitted question. 232 The court
issued the interim order under Article 31 of the Lugano Convention,
which allows the claimant to apply for provisional and protective
measures that may be available under the law of the state of the present
court (i.e., Belgium) even if under the Lugano Convention another state
would have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter (i.e.,
Switzerland).233 The reference to the CJEU seemed unlikely to merit a
decision because Article 267 of the TFEU states that a Member State
may submit an issue for a preliminary ruling only in cases where the
CJEU’s adjudication would be necessary for the presiding court to
make a judgement on the case. 234 However, the presiding court, the
Brussels Court of First Instance, had already concluded that it was
incompetent to give a judgment on the merits of the case because of
lack of jurisdiction. 235 Thus, a CJEU preliminary ruling would not have
been “necessary,” (as required under Article 267), for the presiding
court to provide a judgement because the presiding court did not have
the jurisdictional authority to provide a judgement. 236 As expected, the
CJEU rejected the reference citing the Brussel’s court lack of
international jurisdiction and other factors making such a preliminary
decision pointless. 237
To summarize, the European Commission dismissed the
complaint on procedural grounds and the CJEU declined to provide a
preliminary ruling. 238 Essentially, there has not been an EU court
decision on whether FFP complies with the Article 101. 239 However,
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) has applied Article 101 to
FFP and found that FFP was not in violation. 240 Nevertheless, the
possibility remains that FFP could be challenged under Article 101 by
232. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26-27; see also Van Rompuy, supra note 214.
233. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26.
234. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26; see also TFEU, supra note 194, art. 267, at 164.
235. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26-27.
236. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26-27; see also TFEU, supra note 194, art. 267.
237. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 27.
238. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 25-27.
239. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 27; see generally Serby, supra note 152, at 48-49;
see also Geoff Pearson, Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law:
The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System, 21 EUR. L. J. 220, 231 (2015). But see Galatasaray
v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492 (2016).
240. See Galatasaray, CAS 2016/A/4492, at ¶ 80.
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PSG and that such a challenge would garner a decision on the merits
from the CJEU. 241
2. UEFA’s Adjustment
After the initial promulgation of FFP and subsequent legal
challenges, UEFA revised FFP. 242 Though the challenges to various
aspects of FFP were largely ineffective, the rules were eased to allow
for more equity input by owners. 243 Additionally, UEFA also added the
option for clubs to enter into Settlement Agreements and Voluntary
Agreements, which typically result in less stringent consequences for
clubs who violate, or will violate, FFP’s break-even requirement. 244
A club can enter a Voluntary Agreement when it has undergone a
significant change in ownership or control within twelve months
preceding the application deadline. 245 However, a club must not have
been party to a Voluntary Agreement or subject to any disciplinary
measures within the three reporting periods prior to filing the
application. 246 In contrast to the ex post nature of Settlement
Agreements, Voluntary Agreements are ex ante agreements that allow
clubs to deviate from FFP standards with the ultimate aim of complying
with the break-even requirement in the future. 247 Voluntary
Agreements are defined as being “a structured set of obligations which
are individually tailored to the situation of the club.” 248 Such
agreements include an eventual break-even target (typically four years
from entering the agreement) and require specific operational results
for each reporting period covered by the agreement. 249 The term for a
Voluntary Agreements can be up to four reporting periods. 250

241. See generally Serby, supra note 152, at 45; Dupont, supra note 201.
242. Christopher Flanagan, The Evolution of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Rules – Part 2:
The Legal Challenges, ASSER INT’L SPORTS L. BLOG (Sep. 27, 2017), http://www.asser.nl/
SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-evolution-of-uefa-s-financial-fair-play-rules-part-2-the-legalchallenges-by-christopher-flanagan [https://perma.cc/Y87U-AMD5].
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
246. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
247. Flanagan, supra note 242.
248. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
249. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
250. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
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To enter into a Voluntary Agreement, an application must be
submitted before December 31 of the preceding license season in which
the agreement would come into force. 251 Moreover, the applying club
must submit a long-term future business plan consisting of a balance
sheet, profit and loss statement, and statement of cash flows. 252 The
projections for such statements must be based on “reasonable and
conservative assumptions” and include future break-even information
up to the fourth year after the agreement would come into effect.253
Lastly, the application must also demonstrate the club’s ability to
continue as a going concern until at least the end of the agreement
period. 254 For further security, UEFA has stipulated that in order for a
club to enter into a Voluntary Agreement, the agreement must include
“an irrevocable commitment(s) by an equity participant(s) and related
party(ies) to make contributions for an amount at least equal to the
aggregate future break-even deficits for all the reporting periods
covered by the Voluntary Agreement.” 255 After the club submits it’s
application, it must demonstrate its capacity to meet its stated
targets. 256Subsequently, the CFCB investigatory chamber reviews each
application and, if accepted, monitors the proper and timely
implementation of the Voluntary Agreement. 257 An example of the
application process is CFCB’s denial of AC Milan’s (“Milan”)
application for a Voluntary Agreement. Milan is one of Italy’s largest
and most prestigious football clubs. 258 Milan underwent an ownership
change eight months earlier. 259 CFCB denied Milan’s Voluntary
Agreement citing the “uncertainties in relation to the refinancing of the

242.

251. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
252. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
253. See UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII; see also Flanagan, supra note

254. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
255. Flanagan, supra note 242.
256. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
257. UEFA CLUB LICENSING, supra note 85, annex XII.
258. History,
UEFA,
https://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/seasons/
[https://perma.cc/XKL3-PVHT].
259. Robert Smith, Inter excels in debt play as rival AC Milan struggles, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
21, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d8114654-e651-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da [https://
perma.cc/HZ7A-ULB4].
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loans to be paid back in October 2018 and the financial guarantees
provided by the main shareholders.” 260
UEFA also incorporated the “Settlement Agreement.” 261 A
Settlement Agreement is best described as a plea bargain. 262 Settlement
Agreements differ from Voluntary Agreements because they offer less
intensive repercussions for clubs who are deemed in breach of FFP by
the CFCB. 263 Therefore, the major difference between Settlement
Agreements and Voluntary Agreements is that Settlement Agreements
are made with clubs that the CFCB has already deemed to have failed
in their compliance with FFP while Involuntary Agreements are
entered into prior to the conclusion of an investigation.264 Some
Settlement Agreements appear to be mere slaps on the wrist. In
response, UEFA offered the opportunity of other clubs to challenge the
Settlement Agreement of another club if they find that it is not strict
enough. 265
At the conclusion of an investigation, the CFCB investigator has
the authority to enter into a Settlement Agreement with the investigated
club after consulting with other members of the investigatory
chamber. 266 Similar to a Voluntary Agreement, a Settlement
Agreement may set out necessary obligations for the club, which may
include disciplinary measures. 267 More importantly, the severity of
260. AC Milan request for voluntary agreement rejected, UEFA (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/
news/newsid=2526997.html [https://perma.cc/2LW7-ASP7] [hereinafter Denial of Voluntary
Agreement].
261. Flanagan, supra note 242.
262. See Flanagan, supra note 242; Gabriele Marcotti, Neymar’s record-breaking move:
What it means for Barcelona, PSG and more, ESPN (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.espn.co.uk/
football/blog/marcottis-musings/62/post/3171692/what-neymar-world-record-move-meansfor-barcelona-psg-uefa-ffp-more [https://perma.cc/5YZH-GGXF].
263. UEFA, PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB FINANCIAL CONTROL
BODY arts. 14-15 (2015), available at https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/
Tech/uefaorg/General/02/28/72/46/2287246_DOWNLOAD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WZBC8R9] [hereinafter CFCB GOVERNING RULES]; Rossonero, The differences between the
Voluntary Agreement and the Settlement Agreement, A.C. MILAN INFO (Dec. 9, 2017),
https://www.acmilaninfo.com/milan-differences-voluntary-agreement-settlement-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/MB22-6PA8].
264. CFCB GOVERNING RULES, supra note 262, arts. 14-15.
265. See Marcotti, supra note 233; see also CFCB GOVERNING RULES, supra note 262,
arts. 14, 15, 22
266. See CFCB GOVERNING RULES, supra note 262, art. 14.
267. See CFCB GOVERNING RULES, supra note 262, art. 15.
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future obligations are dependent on the severity of the deficit. 268 An
example of a Settlement Agreement application is F.C. Internazionale
Milano S.p.A (“Inter”), where the CFCB concluded that Inter failed to
meet FFP’s break-even requirement during the 2014-15 season because
it posted a larger-than-permissible deficit. 269 In the Settlement
Agreement, Inter agreed to have a maximum break-even deficit of
EU€30 million for the 2016 reporting period and a balanced budget in
2017. 270 Furthermore, given their failure to comply with FFP during
the 2014-15 season, Inter was fined EU€20 million, which was
withheld from the revenues the club earned from participation in the
Europa League. 271 Of that EU€20 million, EU€6 million was to be paid
in full regardless of the team’s success, and the remaining EU€14
million was conditional upon Inter’s future compliance with FFP. 272
Additionally, Inter agreed to a cap on the number of players that could
participate in future UEFA club competitions. 273
The adaptations to FFP described above could be seen as a direct
response to the Article 101 challenges and a way of insulating UEFA
from future challenges. 274 As discussed in the previous section, the
success of UEFA’s legal battle will depend on the proportionality of its
rules and disciplinary measures in comparison to its objectives. 275 The
incorporation of the Settlement and Voluntary Agreements has made
FFP more flexible and presumably more proportionate. 276
3. The Merits of an Article 101 Challenge
Though UEFA has been successful in winning these cases on
procedural grounds, the substantive issues have yet to be decided on by
an EU court.277 Consequently, the UEFA’s break-even requirement
268. Rossonero, supra note 262.
269. UEFA Club Financial Control Body, Redacted version of the Settlement Agreement
with F.C. Internazionale Milano S.p.A. (“the Club”), http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/
Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/ClubFinancialControl/02/24/67/80/2246780_DOWNLO
AD.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K3J-74ZC] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. Flanagan, supra note 242.
275. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
276. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
277. See Flanagan, supra note 242.
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may again be challenged with anti-competition claims if UEFA seeks
to severely sanction Paris Saint Germain for its rampant spending
during the 2017 Summer. 278
The first legal question is whether EU competition law applies to
sporting activity. Through its White Paper on Sport, the European
Commission stated that while sport brings unique issues, such issues
“cannot be construed so as to justify a general exemption from the
application of EU law.” 279 Moreover, under EU case law, there is no
special exception for sporting cases from European Union competition
law. 280 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) held in Walrave v.
Union Cycliste Internationale that there was no exemption for sport in
the application of the laws of the EC Treaty. 281 More specifically, the
Walrave court held that a professional sport is classified as an economic
activity. 282 In 2006, the ECJ applied Articles 101 and 102, then
Articles 81 and 82, for the first time, and held in Meca-Medina that the
mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not exempt it from
EU law.283 Additionally, the Meca-Medina court determined that if
there is economic activity, then EU competition law applies.284
Therefore, challenges against the application of EU law would likely
be unsuccessful because European football affords clubs the ability to
make millions per year through broadcasting revenue and prize money
and consequentially, would be rendered an economic activity under
Walrave and subject to European Union competition law under MecaMedina. 285 Consequently, Article 101 of the TFEU applies to FFP.
The ECJ in Wouters set forth a test for determining whether a
sports association regulation violated Article 101. 286 The Court found
that it must consider the following: (1) whether the sports association
that promulgated the rule is an “undertaking” or an association of
278. Conn, supra note 1.
279. Kilb, supra note 52, at 823.
280. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass’n Union Cycliste
Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.
281. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1405.
282. Serby, supra note 152, at 38; Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1405.
283. Serby, supra note 152, at 39; Case C-519/04P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v
Commission, 2006 E.C.R. I-699.
284. Serby, supra note 152, at 39; Meca-Medina & Majcen, 2006 E.C.R. at I-699.
285. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 812 - 814; Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-699; Walrave,
1974 E.C.R. 1405; see also Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶41, 44 (2016).
286. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 27-28, 31; C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters v Algemene Raad
van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577.
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undertakings; (2) whether trade between member states is affected; (3)
whether the rule in question restrict competition according to Article
101(1); (4) whether the rule fall into the saving provision of Article
101(3). 287
a. First Question: Is UEFA an Undertaking or Association of
Undertakings?
The first issue is whether UEFA is an undertaking under Article
101. An undertaking is an economic entity. 288 The European
Commission has determined that UEFA is considered both an
association of undertakings and an undertaking itself because of the
ECJ’s view that an undertaking includes “every entity engaged in an
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity.” 289
Furthermore, an entity can be an undertaking regardless of the way it
is financed or if it is profit making. 290 Each club makes money through
the sale of tickets, merchandise, and other revenue. 291 Therefore, each
club falls under the definition of undertaking. 292 When the clubs
combine to form their respective leagues, and, in turn, their football
associations, the football associations are classified as associations of
undertakings. 293 However, the national football associations also
engage in their own economic activity through advertising, selling
tickets and merchandise, and television broadcasting. 294 Consequently,
national football associations constitute undertakings as well. 295 The
football associations then form UEFA, an association of
undertakings. 296

287. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 27-28, 31; J.C.J. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. at I-1577.
288. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814; Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5886, ¶ 77; Bastianon, supra note 146, at
25.
289. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 31.
290. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 31.
291. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814; Dirk Kaufmann, UEFA has commercialized
football, DW (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.dw.de/uefa-has-commercialized-football/a17095173 [https://perma.cc/8R68-WSVG].
292. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814; Kaufmann, supra note 291.
293. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814.
294. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814.
295. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 31; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814
296. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 31; see also Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS
2016/A/4492 ¶60 (2016); see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814.
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UEFA is also an undertaking because it engages in its own
economic activity. 297 UEFA receives money from the media rights and
commercial contracts from its Champions League and Europa League
competitions. UEFA keeps approximately twenty percent of the
amount generated from these tournaments. 298 Because it is revenue
generating, UEFA is likely considered an undertaking for purposes of
Article 101. 299 Therefore, the first Wouters prong is met because UEFA
operates as both an undertaking and an association of undertakings as
required by Article 101 of the TFEU. 300
b. Second Question: Is Trade Between Member States Affected?
The next question is whether trade between Member States is
affected. 301 European case law indicates that trade between member
states is broadly defined and “is not limited to traditional exchange of
goods and services . . . [it covers] all cross-border economic
activity.” 302 FFP likely meets this prong because of its impact on the
exchange of player services, which would fit in the broad definition of
“trade between member states.” 303 Therefore, UEFA affects trade
between member states because the break-even requirement restricts
football clubs’ capacity to purchase players from different member
states. 304
c. Third Question: Does FFP in Effect Restrict Competition?
The following, most contentious question is whether FFP
effectively restricts competition. 305 Striani argued, citing several
scholars, that the break-even rule serves as a relative restriction on

209.

297. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-814.
298. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 31; Case T-193/02, Piau v Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-

299. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 813-14; Kaufmann, supra note 291, at 109.
300. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32.
301. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; see also TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101; Kaplan,
supra note 4, at 817-18.
302. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; Commission Notice (EC), Guidelines on the Effect
on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 81; see
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 817-18.
303. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 817-18.
304. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; Kaplan, supra note 4, at 817-18.
305. See generally TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101; Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS
2016/A/4492 (2016) at 18-19; Bastianon, supra note 146, at 26.
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investment because the club must experience high levels of relevant
income to significantly spend and cannot operate at a deficit larger than
EU€30 million. 306 Furthermore, studies show that there is a direct
relationship with the club’s spending power and their success on the
field, which in turn leads to more revenue through competition awards
and television sponsorships. 307 Consequently, FFP secures the
dominance of the large clubs because they are developed and have
consistent large revenue streams that can fund increased spending
levels. 308 Studies have also shown that the break-even constraints do
not negatively impact the larger well-established clubs to the extent
they do smaller clubs. 309 These studies support the argument that FFP
protects the elite clubs who had well-established sporting and financial
systems prior to FFP’s promulgation. 310 This argument seems
especially compelling when considering that these elite clubs (with the
exception of PSG), have dominated both the market for players and the
competitions since FFP’s implementation.311 Ultimately, FFP serves as
a barrier to entry for new clubs and new investors who take over
clubs. 312 However, the Wouters test requires the presiding judge to
consider three factors in analyzing whether the regulations restrict
competition: (1) the overall context in which the rule was adopted, its
effects, and its objectives, (2) whether the restrictions caused by the
rules are inherent in the pursuit of the objectives, and (3) whether the
rule is proportionate in light of the objective pursued. 313
35.

306. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 823-28, 830-

307. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 823-28,
830-35.
308. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 823-28,
830-35.
309. Ronan Gallagher et al., Regulatory Own Goals: The Unintended Consequences of
Economic Regulation in Professional Football 20 (Working Paper, 2017); see generally Kaplan,
supra note 4, at 823-28, 830-35.
310. See Ronan Gallagher et al., Regulatory Own Goals: The Unintended Consequences
of Economic Regulation in Professional Football 20 (Working Paper, 2017); see generally
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 823-28, 830-35. Contra Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶6768, 74 (2016). The CAS found that there were no negative effects on the market when applying
Article 101.
311. Deloitte
Football
Money League
2019,
DELOITTE
(Jan. 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/sports-business-group/articles/deloitte-football-moneyleague.html [https://perma.cc/E9V6-FFCP] [hereinafter Deloitte Money League]; History, supra
note 258. Contra Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶67-68, 74 (2016).
312. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32.
313. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 28.
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UEFA’s objectives of improving football clubs’ financial
capabilities, transparency, credibility, and protection of creditors, and
the long-term viability of European football likely meet the first
requirement because the objectives are legitimate. 314 In determining
whether the restrictions caused by the rules are inherent in the pursuit
of the objectives, it seems likely that limiting club spending and
investment from wealthy benefactors are inherent in the pursuit of the
aforementioned objectives when considering the history of financial
issues that football clubs experienced as a result of overspending and
overdependence on wealthy owners. 315 When considering the origins
of past financial chaos, the imposition of timely payable payments and
prudent budgetary management are likely also inherent in the pursuit
of ensuring the sustainability and viability of European football
clubs. 316 However, the largest point of contention is FFP’s
proportionality—specifically, the break-even requirement. 317
The function of FFP’s break-even rule is to prevent
overinvestment and usher responsible spending. 318 However, the
overinvestment in players is spurred by the principle that the more you
spend, the more likely you are to win, and the more likely you are to
win, the higher the probability that you will earn monetary awards and
broadcasting revenue. 319 These payouts provide an incentive for clubs
to overinvest in players. 320 Reducing these payouts would diminish the
incentive to overinvest. 321 Therefore, changing this principle through a
recalibration of monetary awards and broadcasting revenue distribution
would likely be a sufficient means in protecting the viability of
European football clubs while simultaneously placing less pressure on
competition than the break-even rule. 322
Another more proportional means of achieving UEFA’s
objectives would be the implementation of a hard spending cap because

35.
35

314. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 33.
315. See Galatasaray, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶77-79. Contra Bastianon, supra note 146, at
316. See Galatasaray, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶77-79. Contra Bastianon, supra note 146, at

317. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 850, 856.
318. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35.
319. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35.
320. Johan Lindholm, The Problem with Salary Caps Under European Union Law: The
Case Against Financial Fair Play, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 189, 211 (2011).
321. See id.
322. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 850, 856.
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overspending would still be curtailed, but the negative effect on
competition would be less severe. 323 FFP is a relative salary cap
because the amount that a club can spend is limited by the revenue it
generates. 324 The large clubs always have the capacity to spend more
on players because they earn more than smaller clubs. 325 This relative
salary cap restricts competition because as mentioned prior, the more
you spend, the higher the likelihood of success, and more success earns
more revenue. 326 This essentially creates a cycle where the same top
teams continue to win and grow their revenue while the smaller teams
are stuck at the bottom because they are unable to grow through
responsible owner investment. 327 Under a hard spending cap regime,
UEFA would accomplish its objective of limiting clubs’ spending and
avoid constraining competition because the spending limitation would
be uniformly applied rather than relative to a club’s earnings.
It is also argued that the prohibition of overdue payables rule
alone is sufficient to protect the sustainability of European football
clubs. 328 The prohibition of overdue payables would prevent the
scenario where clubs spend money they do not have by taking on debt
they cannot feasibly pay back. 329 Therefore, the overdue payable rule
procures future club sustainability because it would prevent football
clubs from becoming insolvent and filing for bankruptcy. 330 On
323. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-839, 854; This
proposition is also supported by the fact that clubs have incurred a dramatic increase in television
revenue that has allowed them to improve their general spending capacity. With a hard cap and
simultaneous increases in broadcast revenue, clubs would theoretically reach financial parity.
2016 UEFA CLUB BENCHMARKING, supra, note 163; MICHAEL BARNARD ET AL., ROAR
POWER: ANNUAL REVIEW OF FOOTBALL FINANCE 2018 (2018), available at
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-businessgroup/deloitte-uk-sbg-annual-review-of-football-finance-2018.PDF [https://perma.cc/SD7DM3Y3] [hereinafter DELOITTE FINANCE REVIEW]; Paul MacInnes, Worldwide websites and
money, money, money: Uefa’s football trends, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/jan/25/worldwide-websites-money-uefa-footballtrends [https://perma.cc/FTV7-Y6NS].
324. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 854.
325. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 854.
326. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 854.
327. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 854.
328. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39,
850.
329. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39,
850.
330. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 35; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39,
850.
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balance, it seems likely that FFP is not proportionate under Wouters.331
Consequently, it is likely FFP effectively restricts competition. 332
d. Fourth Question: Does FFP Fall Under Article 101(3)’s Exception?
Article 101(3) provides a saving provision that could be used for
UEFA’s break-even requirement. 333 Article 101(3) states that
paragraph (1) does not apply in the case of any agreement that meets
the following four conditions:
(a) Improves the production or distribution of goods or the
promotion of technical or economic progress and
(b) Allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
(c) Does not impose on the restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives or
(d) Does not afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect to a substantial part of the
products in questions. 334

To determine whether FFP falls under Article 101(3)’s exception,
these conditions must be considered. This analysis is conducted in the
subsequent sections.
1. Does FFP Improve Economic Efficiency?
The first element questions whether FFP produces economic
efficiencies. 335 The argument in support of FFP is that since the breakeven rule’s promulgation, clubs have experienced cost efficiencies.336
The break-even rule arguably creates efficiencies because it increases
the financial stability and sustainability of football clubs due to its
imposition of a balanced budget. 337 While such arguments are
compelling, issues arise with regard to proving causation between the
331. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34-35. Contra Galatasaray v. UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492
¶¶76-79 (2016).
332. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34-35; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39,
850, 856. Contra Galatasaray, CAS 2016/A/4492 ¶¶76-79.
333. TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101.
334. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37; see generally
TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101 (emphasis added).
335. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
336. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 36; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
337. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
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break-even requirements and the resulting economic efficiencies.338
European football has experienced a boon in television broadcasting
revenue, which could be argued as the largest contributor to the
economic success and stability that these football clubs have
experienced since FFP’s implementation. 339 It would be interesting to
see how a decline in television bidding and broadcast rights deals
would impact the efficiency of European football clubs.340
Nevertheless, UEFA’s argument is compelling given subsequent
results and consequently, the break-even requirement would likely
meet Article 101(3)’s first criteria.
2. Do Consumers Share in the Benefits?
The second element under Article 101(3) questions the
relationship between the break-even requirement and the produced
efficiencies for consumers. 341 UEFA would need to prove that the
consumers receive a fair portion of the efficiencies generated by the
FFP. Here the arguments seem to balance. 342 There are two consumers
to consider when analyzing whether FFP meets this condition, the fans
and the players. Regarding the fans, there has been an increase in both
attendance and viewership due to both stadium investment,343 lucrative
television deals, 344 and improved social media presence. 345 Assuming
arguendo that the economic efficiencies are caused by the break-even
rules, it would seem that fans have shared in the expansion and
improved financial standing of football clubs. 346
The more complex question is whether the players are also sharing
in the assumed economic efficiencies.347 Here, there is uncertainty.
Given FFP’s relative spending cap on European football clubs, it is
338. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
339. MacInnes, supra note 323; DELOITTE FINANCE REVIEW, supra note 323.
340. A weak market for football rights suggests a lower value for sport, THE ECONOMIST
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/01/18/a-weak-market-for-footballrights-suggests-a-lower-value-for-sport [https://perma.cc/C7HG-TS24] [hereinafter A Weak
Market].
341. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
342. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
343. 2015 UEFA CLUB BENCHMARKING, supra note 158, at 35, 45.
344. MacInnes, supra note 323.
345. Joanne Kuzma et al., A Study of the Use of Social Media Marketing in the Football
Industry, 5 J. EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPUTING & INFO. SCI. 728, 729 (2014).
346. 2015 UEFA CLUB BENCHMARKING, supra note 158, at 35.
347. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
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plausible that such caps will hamper the earning potential of football
players. 348 However, wages have continued to rise since FFP’s
implementation. 349 Nevertheless, as mentioned prior, the causation
seems attenuated due to the boon that European football has
experienced from lucrative television deals. 350 Therefore, it may not be
UEFA’s regulatory system that has led to the appreciation in player
wages. In fact, it could be argued that the break-even requirement limits
what otherwise could be an even larger growth in player wages. 351
The argument in favor of FFP is that players are now deciding to
take matters into their own hands by deciding to let their contracts
expire and subsequently sign large contract deals with new clubs.352
This is primarily a result of the ECJ’s Bosman ruling, which opened the
door for players to leave on “free transfers.” 353 A “free transfer” is
where players can be directly approached by clubs for contract talks
after their contracts expire. 354 A free transfer is similar to unrestricted
free agency in the NBA. 355 Typically, the buying club would have to
pay the selling club a transfer fee and then negotiate a contract with the
player. 356 The potential savings are significant because transfer fees
seem to be growing exponentially. 357 For example, the record-breaking
348. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
349. The business of football: Are wages more affordable?, KPMG (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.footballbenchmark.com/leagues_salaries
[https://perma.cc/Y4XX-SUZH]
[hereinafter KPMG Wages].
350. DELOITTE FINANCE REVIEW, supra note 323; MacInnes, supra note 323.
351. See generally Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
352. See generally John Crabb, 10 huge players who are currently going on free transfers
in summer 2018, FOUR FOUR TWO (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.fourfourtwo.com/features/10huge-players-who-are-currently-going-free-transfers-summer-2018 [https://perma.cc/5QZQJ4WP].
353. Gerard Brand, How the Bosman rule changed football - 20 years on, SKY SPORTS
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.skysports.com/football/news/11095/10100134/how-the-bosmanrule-changed-football-20-years-on [https://perma.cc/G3RA-LBLA].
354. Id.
355 See generally Free Agency Explained, NBA, http://www.nba.com/free-agencyexplained [https://perma.cc/H6TB-34HS] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
356. Ben Hayward, Neymar to PSG: How much will he earn, transfer fee, contract length
and full Barcelona exit details, GOAL (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/neymarto-psg-how-much-will-he-earn-transfer-fee-contract-length-/cosb1yh848ew1ergqy3zy562d
[https://perma.cc/H2LJ-DGEV].
357. See id.; see also Miriam Quick, How does a football transfer work? BBC (Aug. 29,
2017),
http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20170829-how-does-a-football-transfer-work;
Eberhard Fees & Gerd Muehlheusser, The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An
Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football, 105 SCANDINAVIAN. J. OF ECON,
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transfer deal for Brazilian star, Neymar, required a transfer fee of
approximately EU€270 million to be paid to the selling club, Barcelona
FC, and a contract with the player that pays him approximately EU€30
million annually. 358 As it stands, Paris Saint-Germain will have
incurred relevant expenses of approximately EU€300 million for the
2017-2018 reporting season. 359 If Neymar had let his contract with
Barcelona expire, he hypothetically would have earned more than
EU€30 million annually because PSG would have avoided adding the
EU€270 million transfer fee to its 2017-2018 relevant expenses.
Therefore, due to the break-even requirement’s relative cap on
spending, free transfers are more attractive because clubs can
circumvent paying transfer fees, leaving more money to allocate to
players’ contracts. 360 As a result, FFP’s break-even requirement
strengthens the incentive for players to let their contracts dwindle down
and then request larger contracts from the buying clubs. 361
Accordingly, it is plausible that players have shared in the efficiencies
generated by FFP because it has compounded their negotiating power
and earnings potential by further incentivizing them to let contracts
expire and declare for the European football equivalent of free agency.
On balance, the arguments opposing FFP appear more
compelling. The current rise in player wages seems to have been
primarily caused by increased broadcasting revenues, rather than FFP’s
implementation. 362 Also, if broadcasting revenue were to decline or
stagnate, FFP’s spending restraints may eventually lead to a
depreciation in player wages regardless of whether players opt to let
their contract expire or transfer fees are paid.363 Consequently, it is
likely that FFP does not produce efficiencies for consumers because
players’ earning power is limited by the relative spending cap. 364
139, 140 (2003) (stating that the fees incurred by the purchasing club during a free transfer would be
less expensive than paying a transfer fee).

358. Jeremy Woo, Report: Neymar transfer to cost PSG nearly €500M in fee and salary,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/08/02/neymar-psgbarcelona-transfer-deal-contract-terms [https://perma.cc/MH57-EXBB].
359. See id.
360. Brand, supra note 316.
361. See Brand, supra note 316.
362. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
363. See generally DELOITTE FINANCE REVIEW, supra note 323; MacInnes, supra note
323; A Weaker Market, supra note 337.
364. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; see generally A Weaker Market, supra note 337;
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
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3. Are the Specific Restrictions Dispensable?
Assuming arguendo that the second element is met, Article 101(3)
requires that for FFP to be upheld, it must not impose restrictions that
are not crucial to the pursuance of the objectives. 365 The European
Commission has provided guidance on the application of this
requirement by promulgating a two-prong test. 366 The first prong is that
the regulation must be reasonably necessary to achieving the purported
efficiencies. 367 The second prong is that the ensuing restrictions on
competition resulting from the regulation must be necessary to attain
the intended efficiencies. 368 Even if FFP was deemed “reasonably
necessary” to achieve the purported efficiencies that followed its
implementation, there does not seem to be a compelling argument that
FFP’s restrictions of competition, caused by the break-even
requirement’s relative spending cap, are reasonably necessary to
achieve the purported efficiencies. 369 As discussed prior, the breakeven requirement’s relative spending cap hampers competition through
its handcuffing of historically smaller teams and reinforcement of the
larger and perennial successful teams. 370 A hard cap on spending,
which is not dependent on each team’s generated revenue, would likely
achieve the same purported efficiencies with less pressure on
competition because each team will be able to spend the same amount
regardless of income. 371 Ultimately, though it is plausible that FFP
satisfies the first prong, it is likely that FFP would fail to meet the third
prong of the Article 101(3) exception.
4. Does FFP Eliminate Competition for the Products in Question?
Lastly, to fall into the Article 101(3) protection, FFP must not
eliminate competition of a substantial part of the products involved.372
365. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101.
366. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; Communication from the Commission (EC),
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 96.
367. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
368. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
369. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
370. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32-33; see also Gallagher, supra note 309, at 20;
see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 823-28, 830-35.
371. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 32; see Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837-39, 854; Serby,
supra note 152, at 47; supra, note 323 and accompanying text.
372. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37; TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101 (emphasis added);
see generally Kaplan, supra note 4, at 835-37.
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Here, the products involved would be the players. 373 FFP’s restrictions
on equity partner and related party investments restrict the easiest way
for smaller clubs to improve its player spending capacity and compete
against the larger clubs. 374 However, FFP would likely satisfy this
prong because even though it eliminates one avenue for improving a
club’s spending capacity, it still permits other revenue streams like
match-day income, TV broadcasting rights, and sponsorship and
commercial income. 375 Thus, the break-even requirement likely
satisfies Article 101(3)’s fourth requirement because it does not
eliminate the competition for players. 376
In conclusion, the analysis in this section reveals that FFP likely
violates Article 101(1) and does not fall into Article 101(3)’s exception.
The potential of meritorious legal challenges under Article 101 should
be considered and evaluated by UEFA. However, as the subsequent
section details, there are regulatory flaws that also deserve UEFA’s
attention.
B.

Regulatory Flaws and Oversights
1. Different Corporate Models

There are different legal forms that a football club can take. The
method in which these clubs raise funds and operate are largely
dependent on such legal forms.
a. The Spanish Socio Model
The first model, which has been criticized by non-Spanish
football clubs, is the Spanish Socio Model. 377 This form of club
governance has been adopted by two international football titans, FC
Barcelona and Real Madrid CF. 378 The model’s dependence on its fans
is the main reason for it being called the “socio” model of club

373. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 837; see generally Bastianon, supra note 146, at 37.
374. Bastianon, supra note 146, at 38.
375. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 38.
376. See Bastianon, supra note 146, at 38; TFEU, supra note 194, art. 101 (emphasis
added).
377. Ryan Murphy, Playing Fair in the Boardroom: An Examination of the Corporate
Structures of European Football Clubs, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 409, 415 (2013).
378. See id.
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governance. 379 The organization of FC Barcelona gives fans large
amounts of influence because its governing power is dependent on its
members. 380 To become and remain a Barcelona “socio,” an applicant
must make a membership payment and maintain “good behavior.”381
Members can elect the president and Board of Directors, who are
responsible for managing the daily operations of the club. 382 The
election process requires that the president and every director provide
a guarantee worth EU€1.5 million to the club. 383 Members may also be
occasionally called upon to vote on any extraordinary issues that may
arise. 384
The club’s structure provides an economic advantage because
they receive a substantial amount of financial support through their
membership dues. 385 Real Madrid operates similarly. 386 One difference
is that in addition to the membership fees and good behavior, there is
the additional requirement that the applicant be recommended by two
current socios. 387 The members also elect a president who must be
Spanish and a member of the club for at least ten consecutive years.388
The elected president must also make a substantial bank guarantee.389
In 2009 that guarantee was EU€57 million. 390 There are also wealth
requirements to gain an elected office at Real Madrid, which ensures
that it is run by competent business men. 391

379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 416.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 417.
384. See id at 415.
385. See id at 417; see also Alex Duff, Barcelona Soccer Club Members Vote to Sue
Laporta After Loss, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2010-10-16/barcelona-soccer-club-members-vote-to-sue-former-president-after-loss.
386. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 420.
387. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 420.
388. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 421; see also REAL MADRID C.F., ESTATUTOS
SOCIALES 11-12 (2009) http://www.realmadrid.com/StaticFiles/RealMadrid/img/pdf/Libro
EstatutosSociales.pdf. [https://perma.cc/7U4W-4PXC] [hereinafter REAL MADRID CLUB
STATUTES].
389. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 420.
390. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 420.
391. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 422.
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b. The German Models
Another form of club governance is the German model which is
unique because of its reputation for being profitable. 392 The
Bundesliga, which is the name for the German league, is comprised of
multiple club governance structures. 393 The traditional structure is the
eingetrager verein (“e.V.”) model which creates a legal personhood for
the club but restricts the liability of its members. 394 This model includes
at least seven members, a board, and a charter. 395 It does not have any
capital requirements and no fixed organizational structure except the
requirement for a board. 396 This legal form provides the most
democratic and Barcelona-like structure to its fans and members, but
many teams have moved away from this form because it is too
decentralized and difficult to make long-term decisions regarding
commercial revenue. 397
The largest club in Germany, Bayern Munich, moved to the
Aktiengesellschaft (“AG”) structure. 398 This model is the most similar
to an American corporation, 399 despite its dual board structure. 400 The
supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) is elected during a shareholders’
general meeting and the managing board (“Vorstand”) is appointed by
the elected supervisory board.401 The supervisory board is also
responsible for advising and monitoring the managing board. 402 Bayern
Munich is unique because the Bundesliga rules prevent the club from
classifying itself as an AG owned completely by shareholders. 403 As a
result, Bayern Munich’s ownership structure is more of an AG-e.V.
392. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 423; see also Jamie Jackson, How the Bundesliga
puts the Premier League to shame, THE OBSERVER (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
football/blog/2010/apr/11/bundesliga-premier-league [https://perma.cc/549Y-UWHP].
393. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 424.
394. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 424.
395. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 424.
396. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 424.
397. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 424.
398. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425.
399. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425.
400. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425.
401. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425.
402. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425.
403. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 425-26; see also Company, FC BAYERN MUNICH,
https://fcbayern.com/en/club/company [] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019) (disclosing that Bayern
Munich e.V owns 75% while the remaining share of the club is owned by Adidas, Audi, and
Allianz).
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hybrid. 404 Therefore, Bayern Munich’s members pay an annual fee to
belong to Bayern Munich e.V., 405 which owns an seventy-five percent
stake in Bayern Munich AG, the professional part of the club. 406 The
remaining percentage is owned by Adidas and Audi. 407 The result of
the hybrid form is that it allows fans to feel invested in the club, while
also creating a more centrally organized operational structure where the
club can raise capital and accommodate local businesses, such as Audi
and Adidas, which in turn provide corporate advice and opportunities
for commercial income. 408
The third model that is used by German clubs in the Bundesliga
is a form of partnership that includes both a general partner and limited
partners. 409 This form of ownership structure is called
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (“KGaA”). 410 Investors can
become limited partners by purchasing shares on the stock exchange.411
This form differs from the AG structure because it has a general partner
that assumes an unlimited personal liability of the KGaA rather than a
Vorstand. 412 The KGaA is ideal for a corporation which intends to
retain a great deal of control over the club while simultaneously being
able to raise capital through the offering of equity. 413 BVB Borussia
Dortmund is the best example of this structure. 414
c. The English Model
The typical English club is registered as a public limited company
(“PLC”). 415 The form is similar to an American corporation and has the
benefit of being permitted to sell shares to the general public.416
However, there are two different models of control: the benefactor
model and the standard business model. 417
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

See Murphy, supra note 377, at 427; see also Company, supra note 403.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 426.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 426; see also Company, supra note 403.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 426.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 427.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 428.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 428.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 429.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 429.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 429.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 429.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 431.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 431.
See Murphy, supra note 377, at 431.
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The benefactor model is a form of control where a rich individual
acts as the sole benefactor of the club.418 One example of this model is
Manchester City FC where the Abu Dhabi United Group, led by Seikh
Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, who is a key member of the Abu Dhabi
royal family, purchased the club in 2008 and directly injected millions
into the club through stadium renovation and player purchases. 419 In
this model, the benefactor typically has complete control over the club
and can make decisions without seeking approval. 420 This model was
also popular in Italy where Silvio Berlusconi and Massimo Moratti
were the wealthy benefactors of A.C. Milan and Internazionale F.C.421
The standard business owner model is a club that is run like a
sustainable business. 422 With this structure, ownership can consist of a
group of individuals or a single person (similar to a benefactor
model). 423 However, this model provides more checks on spending
than the benefactor model. 424 The premier example of this model is
Liverpool FC where capital can be raised through issuing equity or
debt, and management, Fenway Sports Group, is prudent in its
spending and focused on profitability. 425

418. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 431.
419. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 434.
420. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 436.
421. Justin Sherman, THE DEVIL’S ODYSSEY: HOW SILVIO BERLUSCONI TURNED
AC MILAN INTO A SUPERPOWER, THESE FOOTBALL TIMES (APR. 18, 2018),
https://thesefootballtimes.co/2018/04/18/the-devils-odyssey-how-silvio-berlusconi-turned-acmilan-into-a-superpower/ [https://perma.cc/HN7D-4X5T]; see also Ben Gladwell, Ex-owner
Silvio Berlusconi: I am thinking of buying AC Milan back, ESPN (Apr. 27, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/soccer/ac-milan/story/3473597/ex-owner-silvio-berlusconi-i-amthinking-of-buying-ac-milan-back [https://perma.cc/LS5G-XFMQ];
#1425
Massimo
Moratti, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/massimo-moratti/#2aa5d3581e5b [https://
perma.cc/EX9S-QT5J]; Ben Gladwell, Massimo Moratti: I'm not interested in buying back Inter
Milan shares, ESPN (Sept. 21, 2017), http://www.espn.com/soccer/internazionale/story/
3209835/massimo-moratti-im-not-interested-in-buying-back-inter-milan-shares
[https://perma.cc/ZM8Z-BMFU] .
422. Murphy, supra note 377, at 437.
423. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 437.
424. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 437.
425. See Murphy, supra note 377, at 441; see also FSG In or FSG Out? – Debating 7 years
under the Liverpool FC owners, THIS IS ANFIELD (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.thisisanfield.com/2017/10/fsg-fsg-debating-7-years-liverpool-fc-owners/
[https://perma.cc/6J83-SVRP] [hereinafter FSG In or Out].
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages under FFP
As stated above, Barcelona and Real Madrid generate revenue
from membership fees. 426 The income generated from membership fees
is very similar to income from equity partners or related party
transactions, which UEFA has limited through FFP. 427 However,
membership fees paid to the club are not included in the definition of
related party transactions. 428 Instead, the revenue generated from
membership fees is considered football-related income under FFP’s
current form. 429 An absence of regulation on the revenue generated by
membership fees creates an unfair advantage as Umberto Gandini, then
AC Milan Organizing Director and Vice President of the European
Club Association, alluded to when he asked why “180,000 Barcelona
shareholders annually fund their club and Abramovich, to say a random
name, cannot?” 430 Roman Abramovich is the wealthy owner of the
English football club Chelsea Football Club (“Chelsea”). 431 Chelsea
utilizes the wealthy benefactor model due to Roman Abramovich’s
mass wealth. 432 Umberto Gandini’s quote is indicative of how FFP
provides an advantage to clubs that use the socio model and similar
organizational structures over clubs that utilize other models.
1. “Financial Doping” through Lucrative Related Party Deals
Related party sponsorship deals have been used to artificially
enhance a club’s revenue. Paris Saint-Germain has used this tactic in
the past and was reprimanded for such actions in 2014. 433 PSG is
owned by Oryx Qatar Sports Investments (“QSi”), a fund supported by
the Qatari government and under the leadership of Nasser Al-

426. Kilb, supra note 52, at 822.
427. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 822.
428. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 822.
429. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 822.
430. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 822.
431. #140 Roman Abramovich, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/romanabramovich/#30d8a954134a [https://perma.cc/E4KQ-ZAVM] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
432. Id.
433. UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body, Decision of the Chief Investigator of the
CFCB Investigatory Chamber: Settlement Agreement with Paris Saint-Germain Football Club,
https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/ClubFinancialC
ontrol/02/10/68/99/2106899_DOWNLOAD.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U68-JLFP] [hereinafter
PSG 2014 Settlement].
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Khelaifi. 434 In 2013, Nasser Al-Khelaifi was made Minister without
Portfolio in the Qatari government by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh
Tamim. 435 Nasser Al-Khelaifi was also childhood friends with Crown
Prince of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. 436 His company, QSi,
essentially serves as the sports business arm of the Qatari
government. 437 In 2012, the club signed a sponsorship deal with the
Qatar Tourism Authority, which is also managed by the Qatari
Government. 438 The deal proposed to grant PSG approximately
EU€200 million over each of the following four seasons. 439 The deal
was considered “financial doping” because the contract was deemed by
UEFA to have a fair value less than the proposed terms. 440 Financial
Doping is a prevalent issue even after PSG’s 2014 Sanctions. PSG’s
summer purchases of Neymar for EU€270 million and Kylian Mbapeé
for EU€180 million, without any significant player sales, raises
reasonable suspicion that they have financially doped because,

434. Saj Chowdhury, Neymar: How can PSG afford to pay £198m for the Barcelona
forward?,
BBC
(Jul,
22,
2017)
https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/40690701
[https://perma.cc/LB6U-ER64];
see
also
Nasser
Al-Khelaifi,
UEFA.COM,
https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/executive-committee/news/newsid=2590558.html
[https://perma.cc/9V24-YZ4Y] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); see also Andy Brown, Questions
remain over Nasser Al-Khelaifi’s appointment to UEFA, SPORTS INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (Jan.
31, 2019),
https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/questions-remain-over-nasser-alkhelaifis-appointment-to-uefa/ [https://perma.cc/FF94-23FA].
435. See Stephanie Baker, Qatar builds its investments and its influence in a stormy
Middle East, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 9 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/qatar-builds-its-investments-and-its-influence-in-a-stormy-middle-east/2013/08/08/
a09b537e-fe00-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.a195b9f47772 [https://perma.cc/F7F7-XJMW]; see also Qatari
PSG boss Nasser Al-Khelaifi elected to UEFA Executive Committee with DFB support, DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/qatari-psg-boss-nasser-al-khelaifi-elected-to-uefa-executivecommittee-with-dfb-support/a-47383900 [https://perma.cc/8ALS-3576] (last visited Mar. 28,
2018); see generally Nasser Al-Khelaifi, BEIN MEDIA GROUP, https://www.beinmediagroup
.com/the-group/nasser-al-khelaif [https://perma.cc/Q9WG-EMRQ] (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
436. David Hytner, Nasser al-Khelaifi, Paris Saint-Germain’s Mr Big, has dream to
match, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 20, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/sep/20/
nasser-al-khelaifi-paris-saint-germain [https://perma.cc/QG47-FDGP].
437. See id.
438. Kilb, supra note 52, at 818.
439. Kilb, supra note 52, at 818; see also David Conn, PSG v Manchester City emblematic
of how Gulf rivals are fuelling football, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/apr/05/manchester-city-psg-championsleague-football-finance [https://perma.cc/4AQR-VQAG].
440. See Chowdhury, supra note 434; PSG 2014 Settlement, supra note 433, at 1.
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otherwise, PSG’s relevant income likely does not balance their
exorbitant relevant expenses. 441
Another example is Manchester City’s sponsorship deal with
Etihad Airways for more than EU€450 million over ten seasons.442
Manchester City is owned by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan of
the Abu Dhabi ruling family, which also owns Etihad Airways. 443
However, this sponsorship deal differs from PSG’s sponsorship deal
with the Qatar Tourism Authority because it included money for youth
development and stadium naming rights. 444 Notably, the deal does not
say how much is going to each category. 445 The lack of specificity
regarding the allocation of funds and other methods used to add
complexity and ambiguity create a cloud around the source of the
revenue and the fair value of the transaction. 446 Ultimately, such tactics
have made it difficult to determine whether the club is in compliance
with FFP and potentially allowed the club to avoid stricter sanctions.447
Compounding the unfair advantage is UEFA’s toothless
reprimand of these clubs for failing to comply with FFP’s break-even
requirement. For example, PSG agreed to a Settlement Agreement with
441. See Chowdhury, supra note 434; see also David Conn, Paris Saint-Germain may face
UEFA sanctions for over-valued Qatari deals, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/apr/11/psg-may-face-uefa-sanctions-overvaluedqatari-deal [https://perma.cc/M2LD-736W].
442. Kilb, supra note 52, at 819; see also Daniel Taylor, Manchester City bank record
£400m sponsorship deal with Etihad Airways, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 8, 2011),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2011/jul/08/manchester-city-deal-etihad-airways
[https://perma.cc/HW3D-ZTYV].
443. David Conn, Manchester City accounts show Sheikh Mansour has put £1.3bn into
club, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/football/
2018/sep/13/manchester-city-accounts-sheikh-mansour [https://perma.cc/2FWV-Z4L6];
MANCHESTER CITY, https://www.mancity.com/fans-and-community/club/corporateinformation [https://perma.cc/A643-TUEZ] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019); Corporate profile,
ETIHAD, https://www.etihad.com/en-us/about-us/corporate-profile/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
444. Kilb, supra note 52, at 819.
445. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 819.
446. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 819; see also Tom Morgan, Manchester City could face
Champions League ban from next season, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2018/12/03/manchester-city-could-face-championsleague-ban-next-season/ [https://perma.cc/6H4K-K6TN] [hereinafter Morgan, Champions
League ban]; Tom Morgan, Uefa's chief investigator confirms Manchester City could face
Champions League ban, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/
2019/01/03/uefa-chief-investigator-confirms-manchester-city-could-face/
[https://perma.cc/
4KLR-KYY2] [hereinafter Morgan, Uefa’s chief investigator confirms].
447. See Kilb, supra note 52, at 819; see also Morgan, Champions League ban, supra note
446; Morgan, Uefa’s chief investigator confirms, supra note 446.
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the CFCB for its financial doping in 2014. 448 The terms stipulated that
PSG pay a fine of EU€60 million, which were to be withheld from the
revenue it generated from UEFA competitions, and be limited to
registering a maximum of twenty-one players for UEFA tournaments
instead of the customary twenty-five players. 449 Moreover, the
settlement required that PSG report a maximum break-even deficit of
EU€30 million for the following year, and then break-even the
following year. 450 Such terms are a slap on the wrist for a club that is
as wealthy as PSG.
2. Lack of Proactivity and Regulations Regarding New Buyers
Italian football club giant AC Milan was sold in 2017 by former
Italy-prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to Yonghong Li for
approximately EU€750 million. 451 The following summer, the new AC
Milan ownership spent approximately EU€200 million in bringing in
new players. 452 However, as the New York Times reported, there was
intense suspicion as to the identity of these new owners and their
financial resources. 453 The New York Times reported that Yonghong’s
claimed mining assets were in fact owned by someone else.454
Furthermore, leading up to the purchasing of AC Milan, Yonghong Li
borrowed EU€250 million from Elliot Management with an
approximate ten percent interest rate and a change of control default
provision. 455 The same Elliot Management who engaged in a fifteenyear debt battle with Argentina. 456 The inability to receive lending from
traditional banks, combined with China’s crackdown on foreign
investment, raised suspicion as to the credibility and capacity of AC
Milan’s Owners. In February 2018, Milan owner Yonghong Li was
448. PSG 2014 Settlement, supra note 433, at 1.
449. See PSG 2014 Settlement, supra note 433, at 1.
450. See PSG 2014 Settlement, supra note 433, at 1.
451. Smith, supra note 258.
452. Tom Sunderland, AC Milan Owner Reportedly Tried and Failed to Refinance Club
Using Bitcoin, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 26, 2018), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2766614-ac-milan-owner-reportedly-tried-and-failed-to-refinance-club-using-bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/PFU6-KKG8].
453. Tariq Panja et al., China’s Soccer Push Puts a Storied Team Under Murky
Ownership, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/business/
dealbook/china-soccer-acmilan-ownership.html?mwrsm=Facebook.
454. See id.
455. Smith, supra note 258.
456. Smith, supra note 258.
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reported to have declared bankruptcy, less than a year after purchasing
the team. 457 A few days prior, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission announced the commencement of an investigation into
potential illicit practices from his holding company Shenzhen Jie
Ande. 458 Furthermore, the report claims that Yonhong Li was already
insolvent by the time he gained control of the club in April 2017.459
The rumors of bankruptcy subsequently subsided. 460 However, later
reports have indicated that the lack of transparency regarding the
owners was a significant impediment to any refinancing of the debt.461
UEFA took notice of the financial issues facing AC Milan’s owner, as
it was the primary basis for the rejection of AC Milan’s application for
a Voluntary Agreement, citing “uncertainties in relation to the
refinancing of the loans to be paid back in October 2018 and the
financial guarantees provided by the main shareholder.” 462 In other
457. See Reports: AC Milan Owner Yonghong Li Declares Bankruptcy, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 19. 2018), https://www.si.com/soccer/2018/02/19/ac-milan-owneryonghong-li-declared-bankrupt-according-reports-italy
[https://perma.cc/JF3F-BBR9]
[hereinafter AC Milan Owner Bankruptcy]; see also Milena Gabanelli & Mario Gerevini, La
cassaforte che ha comprato il Milan era già vuota, CORRIERE DELLA SERA (Feb. 18. 2018),
https://www.corriere.it/dataroom-milena-gabanelli/cassaforte-che-ha-comprato-milan-era-giavuota/2ee58002-1344-11e8-bbf7-75f50a916419-va.shtml?refresh_ce-cp
[https://perma.cc/PUH9-6QXV].
458. AC Milan Owner Bankruptcy, supra note 457.
459. See AC Milan Owner Bankruptcy, supra note 457.
460. Smith, supra note 258.
461. Smith, supra note 258.
462. Denial of Voluntary Agreement, supra note 260; see also Bobby McMahon, More
Bad News For AC Milan, Facing UEFA Punishment With Less Than Six Months To Refinance
$410M, FORBES (May 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobbymcmahon/2018/05/23/
more-bad-news-for-ac-milan-less-than-six-months-to-refinance-410m-and-facing-uefasanctions/#2e616a013af2 [https://perma.cc/GMJ3-XGYM] [hereinafter McMahon, More Bad
News]; Bobby McMahon, UEFA Not Convinced By Milan Financial Fair Play Pitch; Rejects
Option Of A Voluntary Settlement, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bobbymcmahon/2017/12/15/uefa-not-convinced-by-milans-financial-fair-play-pitchrejects-option-of-a-voluntary-settlement/#4aa514a22dca
[https://perma.cc/28Z2-D37Y]
[hereinafter McMahon, UEFA Not Convinced]; Ryan Benson, AC Milan to re-enter Europa
League as CAS rules to overturn ban, GOAL.COM (Jul. 20, 2018), https://www.goal.com/enus/news/ac-milan-set-to-re-enter-europa-league-as-cas-rules-to/11ylzmak1uhfs1bhbth03eh2a3
(citing CAS’s focus on the change in ownership as a primary factor for the overturning of
UEFA’s decision to ban AC Milan from the Europa League); Ben Gladwell, AC Milan's Europa
League ban over FFP breach overturned by CAS, ESPN (Jul. 20, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/soccer/ac-milan/story/3570368/ac-milans-europa-league-ban-over-ffpbreach-overturned-by-cas [https://perma.cc/G8N5-B7BK] (reporting that the change in
ownership was a key factor in the CAS’s overturning of UEFA’s decision to ban AC Milan from
the Europa League).
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words, UEFA was skeptical of Milan’s long-term viability under the
new regime. 463 The financial uncertainty led to statements from Silvio
Berlusconi indicating that if conditions continued to deteriorate, he
would buy back the club. 464 In the summer of 2018, under the change
of control default remedy in the loan agreement, Elliot Management
seized control of AC Milan. 465 AC Milan’s financial and ownership
instability reveals UEFA’s lack of diligence of the financial risks that
are inherent in the sale of European clubs to new buyers.
As argued in this Section, Financial Fair Play’s legal questions
and regulatory oversights call into question its effectiveness and
sustainability. Such issues raise serious doubts regarding FFP’s
capacity to protect creditors and ensure the viability of European
football clubs. The following Section suggests modifications to FFP
that could potentially ameliorate some of these issues.
VI. MOVING FORWARD
The anti-competitive legal claims against FFP are compelling.466
Consequently, FFP likely stands on unsteady legal ground.
Furthermore, as PSG has shown, clubs have found ways to circumvent
FFP. 467 Nevertheless, it is evident that FFP has garnered positive
financial results. 468 Therefore, a complete overhaul of FFP is
unnecessary as only modifications are needed. The proposed
modifications are intended to improve the proportionality of FFP and
ameliorate some regulatory flaws.
The first proposal is to impose an absolute spending cap rather
than the current break-even relative spending cap. An absolute
463. See generally Denial of Voluntary Agreement, supra note 260; see also McMahon,
UEFA Not Convinced, supra note 462 (regarding AC Milan’s facing of potential punishment
from UEFA and UEFA’s rejection of a voluntary agreement); McMahon, More Bad News,
supra note 462 (regarding AC Milan’s facing of potential punishment from UEFA and
UEFA’s rejection of a voluntary agreement).
464. Ben Gladwell, Ex-owner Silvio Berlusconi: I am thinking of buying AC Milan back,
ESPN (Apr. 27, 2018), http://kwese.espn.com/football/ac-milan/story/3473597/ex-ownersilvio-berlusconi-i-am-thinking-of-buying-ac-milan-back [https://perma.cc/SAT2-TJ47].
465. Elliott takes control of AC Milan and announces significant capital injection, CALCIO
FINANZA (July 11, 2018), https://en.calcioefinanza.com/2018/07/11/elliott-takes-control-acmilan-announces-significant-capital-injection/ [https://perma.cc/VB68-BU74].
466. See supra Section V.A.3.
467. See supra Section V.B.
468. See supra Section IV.C.
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spending cap would assist in achieving FFP’s goal of tapering football
clubs’ spending while simultaneously increasing competition because
all clubs would have the same spending limitations. 469 The absolute
spending cap does not favor larger clubs to the extent that the breakeven requirement’s relative spending cap does. 470 The hard cap on
spending is less restrictive of competition and more acceptable under
the Wouters analysis. 471 The absolute spending cap also cures FFP’s
regulatory flaws because clubs, like PSG, could not circumvent the
spending cap by purchasing players via a form of financial doping. By
replacing the break-even requirement with an absolute spending cap,
financial doping would lose its appeal because, under the absolute cap,
a clubs’ spending capacity is not dependent on its “relevant income.”
Thus, the absolute spending cap eases both legal and regulatory
pressures facing FFP.
A second proposal is to create an exception to the break-even
requirement for clubs that experience a change of ownership. This
modification to FFP would allow these clubs to incur a higher deficit if
it is completely covered by a direct injection of capital from the owners.
This modification counters the plausible legal anti-competition
argument that FFP keeps smaller pre-FFP teams small. 472 Such an
exception would make FFP more proportional because its allowance
for more investment will loosen its pressure on competition while still
limiting the risky spending that spurred FFP.
Finally, the last modification would be to create a screening
process for potential club buyers. FFP should incorporate a preliminary
judgment process where the CFCB evaluates the amount of debt that
the new owner raised to make the purchase, their capacity to service
the debt, and the club’s projected future cash flow and capital structure.
Essentially, the CFCB would assess the leverage that is being added to
the club as a result of the takeover and assess the club’s longevity postpurchase. UEFA likely has no legal authority to prevent such a
transaction. Nevertheless, UEFA should issue a statement indicating
concerns with the potential new owners’ capacity to fund the team and
the club’s sustainability post-purchase. Such a statement would
469. Lindholm, supra note 320, at 211.
470. See supra Section V.A.3; Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34-35; Serby, supra note 152,
at 47; supra note 323 and accompanying text.
471. See supra Section V.A.3; Bastianon, supra note 146, at 34-35; Serby, supra note
152, at 47; supra note 323 and accompanying text.
472. Dupont, supra note 201.
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incentivize fans to boycott the club and voice their opposition to the
team, and in turn, either dissuade the owner in completing the sale or
push both parties back to the negotiation table to pursue a better deal
structure.
VII. CONCLUSION
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations have brought financial
stability to European football. Nevertheless, both legal and regulatory
issues exist. FFP’s prevalent issues will likely be revealed on a grander
scale due to CFCB’s pending decision on PSG’s explicit violation of
the break-even requirement. UEFA’s adoption of the proposed
modification would likely ameliorate some of these legal and
regulatory issues. Nevertheless, it is likely that 2019 will be a strong
test of FFP’s effectiveness and sustainability.

